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作者：Alos-Ferrer, Carlos; Prat, Julien
作者单位：University of Konstanz; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE)
摘要：We consider a signaling model where the sender's continuation value after signaling depends on his type, for instance because the receiver is able to update his posterior belief. As a leading example, we introduce Bayesian learning in a variety of environments ranging from simple two-period to continuous-time models with stochastic production. Signaling equilibria present two major departures from those obtained in models without learning. First, new mixed-strategy equilibria involving multipl...
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作者：Galichon, Alfred; Henry, Marc
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We propose a multivariate extension of Yaari's dual theory of choice under risk. We show that a decision maker with a preference relation on multidimensional prospects that preserves first order stochastic dominance and satisfies comonotonic independence behaves as if evaluating prospects using a weighted sum of quantiles. Both the notions of quantiles and of comonotonicity are extended to the multivariate framework using optimal transportation maps. Finally, risk averse decision makers are ch...
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作者：Araujo, Aloisio; Kubler, Felix; Schommer, Susan
作者单位：University of Zurich; Getulio Vargas Foundation; Swiss Finance Institute (SFI)
摘要：In this paper we examine the effects of default and collateral on risk sharing. We assume that there is a large set of assets which all promise a risk less payoff but which distinguish themselves by their collateral requirements. In equilibrium m agents default, the assets have different payoffs, and there are as many linearly independent assets available for trade as there are states of the world. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibria to be Pareto-efficient in the prese...
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作者：Miralles, Antonio
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：In allocating goods with no use of monetary transfers, random allocation mechanisms can be designed in order to elicit information on preference intensities. I study the nontransfer allocation of two ex-ante identical objects under Bayesian incentive compatibility, with symmetric agents and independent private valuations. I find the ex-ante utilitarian-optimal mechanism, in which the probability of receiving a specified object is used as numeraire to purchase probability units of the other obj...
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作者：Mezzetti, Claudio; Renou, Ludovic
作者单位：University of Melbourne; University of Essex
摘要：A mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if, at any preference profile, the set of all (pure and mixed) Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of f -optimal alternatives for all cardinal representations of the preference profile. Unlike Maskin's definition, our definition does not require each optimal alternative to be the outcome of a pure equilibrium. We show that set-monotonicity, a weakening of Maskin's monotonicity, is necessary for mixed...
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作者：Serrano-Padial, Ricardo
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：This paper studies pricing patterns in a speculative market with asymmetric information populated by both sophisticated and naive traders. Three pricing regimes arise in equilibrium: perfect pricing, with prices equalling asset values, partial mispricing and complete mispricing. Perfect pricing obtains when the presence of naive traders is small although not necessarily zero. When the fraction of naive traders is moderate prices are correct for some values but not for others. Finally, complete...
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作者：Gill, David; Sgroi, Daniel
作者单位：University of Warwick; University of Oxford
摘要：We develop a framework in which: (i) a firm can have a new product tested publicly before launch; and (ii) tests vary in toughness, holding expertise fixed. Price flexibility boosts the positive impact on consumer beliefs of passing a tough test and mitigates the negative impact of failing a soft test. As a result, profits are convex in toughness: the firm selects either the toughest or softest test available. The toughest test is optimal when consumers start with an unfavorable prior and rece...
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作者：Jacquet, Nicolas L.; Tan, Serene
作者单位：University of Adelaide; Singapore Management University; National University of Singapore
摘要：We consider a directed search model with risk-averse workers and risk-neutral entrepreneurs who can set up firms that post wage-vacancy contracts, i.e., contracts where firms can make payments to more than one applicant, and where the payments can be different for each applicant and be contingent on the number of applicants. We establish that the type of contracts the literature focuses on are not offered if firms can post wage-vacancy contracts. We show that there exists an equilibrium satisf...
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作者：Christensen, Peter Ove; Larsen, Kasper; Munk, Claus
作者单位：Aarhus University; Carnegie Mellon University; Aarhus University
摘要：In a finite time horizon, incomplete market, continuous-time setting with dividends and investor incomes governed by arithmetic Brownian motions, we derive closed-form solutions for the equilibrium risk-free rate and stock price for an economy with finitely many heterogeneous CARA investors and unspanned income risk. In equilibrium, the Shame ratio is the same as in an otherwise identical complete market economy, whereas the risk-free rate is lower and, consequently, the stock price is higher....
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作者：Grimm, Veronika; Mengel, Friederike
作者单位：University of Erlangen Nuremberg; University of Nottingham; Maastricht University
摘要：We study how players learn to make decisions if they face many different games. Games are drawn randomly from a set of either two or six games in each of 100 rounds. If either there are few games or if extensive summary information is provided (or both) convergence to the unique Nash equilibrium generally occurs. Otherwise this is not the case. We demonstrate that there are learning spillovers across games but participants learn to play strategically equivalent games in the same way. Our desig...
