Job market signaling and employer learning

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Alos-Ferrer, Carlos; Prat, Julien
• 署名单位: University of Konstanz; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.018
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 1787-1817
• 关键词: Employer learning; signaling games; Intuitive criterion; Multiple pooling

摘要

We consider a signaling model where the sender's continuation value after signaling depends on his type, for instance because the receiver is able to update his posterior belief. As a leading example, we introduce Bayesian learning in a variety of environments ranging from simple two-period to continuous-time models with stochastic production. Signaling equilibria present two major departures from those obtained in models without learning. First, new mixed-strategy equilibria involving multiple pooling are possible. Second, pooling equilibria can survive the Intuitive Criterion when learning is efficient enough. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.