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作者：Luttmer, Erzo G. J.
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要：Suppose firms are subject to decreasing returns and permanent idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Suppose also firms can only stay in business by continuously paying a fixed cost. New firms can enter. Firms with a history of relatively good productivity shocks tend to survive and others are forced to exit. This paper identifies assumptions about entry that guarantee a stationary firm size distribution and lead to balanced growth. The range of technology diffusion mechanisms that can be consider...
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作者：Babaioff, Moshe; Feldman, Michal; Nisan, Noam; Winter, Eyal
作者单位：Microsoft; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We study a combinatorial variant of the classical principal-agent model. In our setting a principal wishes to incentivize a team of strategic agents to exert costly effort on his behalf. Agents' actions are hidden and the principal observes only the outcome of the team, which depends stochastically on the complex combinations of the efforts by the agents. The principal seeks the mechanism that maximizes the principal's net revenue given an equilibrium behavior of the agents. We investigate the...
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作者：Galor, Oded; Michalopoulos, Stelios
作者单位：Brown University; Tufts University; Institute for Advanced Study - USA
摘要：This research suggests that a Darwinian evolution of entrepreneurial spirit played a significant role in the process of economic development and the dynamics of inequality within and across societies. The study argues that entrepreneurial spirit evolved non-monotonically in the course of human history. In early stages of development, risk-tolerant, growth promoting traits generated an evolutionary advantage and their increased representation accelerated the pace of technological progress and t...
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作者：Sandholm, William H.
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We consider models of stochastic evolution in two-strategy games in which agents employ imitative decision rules. We introduce committed agents: for each strategy, we suppose that there is at least one agent who plays that strategy without fail. We show that unlike the standard imitative model, the model with committed agents generates unambiguous infinite horizon predictions: the asymptotics of the stationary distribution do not depend on the order in which the mutation rate and population si...
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作者：Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We show that collusion and wrong beliefs may cause a dramatic efficiency loss in the Vickrey mechanism for auctioning a single good in limited supply. We thus put forward a new mechanism guaranteeing efficiency in a very adversarial collusion model, where the players can partition themselves into arbitrarily many coalitions, exchange money with each other, and perfectly coordinate their actions. Our mechanism bypasses classic impossibility results (such as those of Green and Laffont, and of Sc...
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作者：Buera, Francisco J.; Kaboski, Joseph P.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Notre Dame
摘要：We consider broad patterns of structural change: (i) sectoral reallocations, (ii) rich movements of productive activities between home and market, and (iii) an increase in establishment size, especially in manufacturing. We extend these facts and develop a unified model explaining them. The crucial distinction across manufacturing, services and home production is the scale of the productive unit. In manufacturing, scale technologies lead to industrialization and marketization. In services, the...
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作者：Alcantud, Jose Carlos R.
作者单位：University of Salamanca
摘要：This paper investigates ethical aggregation of infinite utility streams by representable social welfare relations. We prove that the Hammond Equity postulate and other variations of it like the Pigou Dalton transfer principle are incompatible with positive responsiveness to welfare improvements by every generation. The case of Hammond Equity for the Future is investigated too. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Ekmekci, Mehmet; Gossner, Olivier; Wilson, Andrea
作者单位：Northwestern University; Paris School of Economics; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; New York University
摘要：We study the impact of unobservable stochastic replacements for the long-run player in the classical reputation model with a long-run player and a series of short-run players. We provide explicit lower bounds on the Nash equilibrium payoffs of a long-run player, both ex-ante and following any positive probability history. Under general conditions on the convergence rates of the discount factor to one and of the rate of replacement to zero, both bounds converge to the Stackelberg payoff if the ...
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作者：Kraehmer, Daniel
作者单位：University of Bonn; University of Bonn
摘要：This paper studies optimal auction design when the seller can affect the buyers' valuations through an unobservable ex ante investment. The key insight is that the optimal mechanism may have the seller play a mixed investment strategy so as to create correlation between the buyers' otherwise (conditionally) independent valuations. Assuming that the seller announces the mechanism before investing, the paper establishes conditions on the investment technology so that a mechanism exists which lea...
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作者：Reis, Catarina
作者单位：Universidade Catolica Portuguesa
摘要：This paper considers a representative agent model of linear capital and labor income taxation in which the government cannot commit ex-ante to a sequence of policies for the future. In this setup, if the government is more impatient than the households, the capital income tax will be positive in steady state. Thus, impatience and lack of commitment are able to generate positive capital taxes in the long run, although each of these characteristics individually was not. Furthermore, the steady s...
