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作者：Duffie, Darrell; Sun, Yeneng
作者单位：Stanford University; National University of Singapore
摘要：This paper provides a mathematical foundation for independent random matching of a large population, as widely used in the economics literature. We consider both static and dynamic systems with random mutation, partial matching arising from search, and type changes induced by matching. Under independence assumptions at each randomization step, we show that there is an almost-sure constant cross-sectional distribution of types in a large population, and moreover that the multi-period cross-sect...
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作者：Balasko, Yves
作者单位：University of York - UK
摘要：This paper analyzes the stability of the (Pareto efficient) nonsunspot equilibria as a function of the constraints faced by consumers in their ability to transfer wealth between states of nature. Equilibria that are stable for the certainty economy define nonsunspot equilibria that are stable in the following two polar cases: 1) All consumers are unconstrained; 2) All consumers are fully constrained. Furthermore, the stable certainty equilibria with small trade vectors define nonsunspot equili...
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作者：Evren, Oezguer
作者单位：New Economic School
摘要：I propose a game-theoretic model of costly voting that predicts significant turnout rates even when the electorate is arbitrarily large. The model has two key features that jointly drive the result: (i) some agents are altruistic (or ethical), (ii) among the agents who prefer any given candidate, the fraction of altruistic agents is uncertain. When deciding whether to vote or not, an altruistic agent compares her private voting cost with the expected contribution of her vote to the welfare of ...
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作者：Geromichalos, Athanasios
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：I consider a model of directed search where strategic sellers advertise general trading mechanisms. A mechanism determines the number of buyers that will get served and the side payments, as a function of ex-post realized demand. Buyers observe these advertisements and visit one seller without being able to coordinate their visiting strategies. Despite the oligopolistic nature of the model, all symmetric equilibria are constrained-efficient. In small markets, multiple equilibria exist that are...
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作者：Rubinstein, Ariel; Segal, Uzi
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; New York University; Boston College
摘要：One problem caused by cycles of choice functions is indecisiveness decision makers will be paralyzed when they face choice sets with more than two options. We investigate the procedure of random sampling where the alternatives are random variables. When comparing any two alternatives, the decision maker samples each of the alternatives once and ranks them according to the comparison between the two realizations. We show that while this procedure may lead to violations of transitivity, the prob...
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作者：Gravel, Nicolas; Moyes, Patrick
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Bordeaux; CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); Aix-Marseille Universite
摘要：We provide foundations for robust normative evaluation of distributions of two attributes, one of which is cardinally measurable and transferable between individuals and the other is ordinal and non-transferable. The result that we establish takes the form of an analogue to the standard Hardy-Littlewood-Polya theorem for distributions of one cardinal attribute. More specifically, we identify the transformations of the distributions which guarantee that social welfare increases according to uti...
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作者：Albrecht, James; Gautier, Pieter; Vroman, Susan
作者单位：Georgetown University; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
摘要：We consider a market in which sellers compete for buyers by advertising reserve prices for second-price auctions. Applying the limit equilibrium concept developed in Peters and Severinov (1997) [1], we show that the competitive matching equilibrium is characterized by a reserve price of zero. This corrects a result in Peters and Severinov (1997) [1]. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Manelli, Alejandro M.; Vincent, Daniel R.
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
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作者：Koessler, Frederic; Martimort, David
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Paris School of Economics
摘要：This paper investigates optimal mechanisms in a principal agent framework with a two-dimensional decision space, quadratic payoffs and no monetary transfers. If the conflicts of interest between the principal and the agent are different on each dimension, then delegation is always strictly valuable. The principal can better extract information from the agent by using the spread between the two decisions as a costly screening device. Delegation sets no longer trade off pooling intervals and int...
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作者：Mueller, Alfred; Scarsini, Marco
作者单位：Luiss Guido Carli University; Universitat Siegen; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：There exist several characterizations of concavity for univariate functions. One of them states that a function is concave if and only if it has nonincreasing differences. This definition provides a natural generalization of concavity for multivariate functions called inframodularity. lnframodular transfers are defined and it is shown that a finite lottery is preferred to another by all expected utility maximizers with an inframodular utility if and only if the first lottery can be obtained fr...
