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作者：Damiano, Ettore; Hao, Li; Suen, Wing
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of British Columbia; University of Hong Kong
摘要：Two organizations compete for high quality agents from a fixed population of heterogeneous qualities by designing how to distribute their resources among members according to their quality ranking. The peer effect induces both organizations to spend the bulk of their resources on higher ranks in an attempt to attract top talents that benefit the rest of their membership. Equilibrium is asymmetric, with the organization with a lower average quality offering steeper increases in resources per ra...
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作者：Sprumont, Yves
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We study the problem of defining inequality-averse social orderings over allocations of commodities when individuals have different preferences. We formulate a notion of egalitarianism based on the axiom that any dominance between consumption bundles should be reduced. This Dominance Aversion requirement is compatible with Consensus, a version of the Pareto principle saying that an allocation y is better than x whenever everybody finds that everyone's bundle at y is better than at x. We charac...
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作者：Garicano, Luis; Rossi-Hansberg, Esteban
作者单位：Princeton University; Princeton University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We propose a framework to study the impact of information and communication technology on growth through its impact on organization and innovation. Agents accumulate knowledge to use available technologies and invent new ones. The use of a technology requires the development of organizations to coordinate the work of experts, which takes time. We find that while advances in information technology always increase growth, improvements in communication technology may lead to lower growth and even...
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作者：Arieli, Itai; Babichenko, Yakov
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Oxford; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing strategic games: average testing. In this procedure each player sticks to her current strategy if it yields a payoff that exceeds her average payoff by at least some fixed epsilon > 0; otherwise she chooses a strategy at random. We consider generic two-person games where both players play according to the average testing procedure on blocks of k-periods. We demonstrate that for all k large enough, the pair of time-average payoffs converges (al...
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作者：Chakravarty, Satya R.; Zoli, Claudio
作者单位：University of Verona; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata
摘要：The objective of this paper is to derive some integer-majorization results for variable-sum comparisons. We use an axiomatic framework to establish equivalence between several intuitively reasonable conditions. (c) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Dybvig, Philip H.; Wang, Yajun
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：Oliver Hart proved the impossibility of deriving general comparative static properties in portfolio weights. Instead, we derive new comparative statics for the distribution of payoffs: A is less risk averse than B iff A's payoff is always distributed as B's payoff plus a non-negative random variable plus conditional-mean-zero noise. If either agent has nonincreasing absolute risk aversion, the non-negative part can be chosen to be constant. The main result also holds in some incomplete markets...
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作者：Abreu, Dilip; Manea, Mihai
作者单位：Princeton University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are randomly matched to bargain over a unit surplus. Players who reach agreement are removed from the network without replacement. The global logic of efficient matchings and the local nature of bargaining, in combination with the irreversible exit of player pairs following agreements, create severe hurdles to the attainment of efficiency in equilibrium. For many networks all Markov perfect equilibria of the bar...
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作者：Krishna, Vijay; Morgan, John
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We compare voluntary and compulsory voting in a Condorcet-type model in which voters have identical preferences but differential information. With voluntary voting, all equilibria involve sincere voting and positive participation. Thus, in contrast to situations with compulsory voting, there is no conflict between strategic and sincere behavior. When voting is costless, voluntary voting is welfare superior to compulsory voting. Even when voting is costly, participation rates are such that, in ...
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作者：Bogomolnaia, Anna; Heo, Eun Jeong
作者单位：University of Rochester; Rice University
摘要：We study the problem of assigning a set of objects to a set of agents, when each agent receives one object and has strict preferences over the objects. In the absence of monetary transfers, we focus on the probabilistic rules, which take the ordinal preferences as input. We characterize the serial rule, proposed by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) [2]: it is the only rule satisfying sd efficiency, sd no-envy, and bounded invariance. A special representation of feasible assignment matrices by mean...
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：This note shows that for two social welfare functions which are inequality averse with respect to certainty equivalents, if one is more inequality averse for certainty equivalents than the other, the household preference induced by optimally allocating aggregate bundles according to this social welfare function is more risk averse than the other. We present examples showing that this comparative static can be reversed if absolute inequality aversion is dropped. We show that the utilitarian rul...
