Stochastic imitative game dynamics with committed agents

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sandholm, William H.
• 署名单位: University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.018
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 2056-2071
• 关键词: Evolutionary game theory; imitation; Committed agents; stochastic stability; equilibrium selection

摘要

We consider models of stochastic evolution in two-strategy games in which agents employ imitative decision rules. We introduce committed agents: for each strategy, we suppose that there is at least one agent who plays that strategy without fail. We show that unlike the standard imitative model, the model with committed agents generates unambiguous infinite horizon predictions: the asymptotics of the stationary distribution do not depend on the order in which the mutation rate and population size are taken to their limits. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.