Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kraehmer, Daniel
• 署名单位: University of Bonn; University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.11.015
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 118-141
• 关键词: auction; Ex ante investment; full surplus extraction; correlation; mechanism design

摘要

This paper studies optimal auction design when the seller can affect the buyers' valuations through an unobservable ex ante investment. The key insight is that the optimal mechanism may have the seller play a mixed investment strategy so as to create correlation between the buyers' otherwise (conditionally) independent valuations. Assuming that the seller announces the mechanism before investing, the paper establishes conditions on the investment technology so that a mechanism exists which leaves buyers no information rent and leaves the seller indifferent between his investments. Under these conditions, the seller can, in fact, extract the first best surplus almost fully. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.