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作者：Ortoleva, Pietro
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：We study the behavior of an agent who dislikes large choice sets because of the 'cost of thinking' involved in choosing from them. Focusing on preferences over lotteries of menus, we introduce the notion of Thinking Aversion. We characterize preferences as the difference between an affine evaluation of the content of the menu and a function that assigns to each menu a thinking cost. We provide conditions for which this cost can be seen as the cost that the agent has to sustain to figure out he...
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作者：Chatterji, Shurojit; Sanver, Remzi; Sen, Arunava
作者单位：Singapore Management University; Istanbul Bilgi University; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：In this paper, we investigate domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions. We show that if the number of voters is even, then every domain that satisfies a richness condition and admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function, must be semi-single-peaked. Conversely every semi-single-peaked domain admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function. Semi-single-peaked domains are generalizations of s...
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作者：Momi, Takeshi
作者单位：Doshisha University
摘要：We show that in pure exchange economies there exists no Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanism that ensures positive consumption for all agents. We also show that a Pareto-efficient, strategy-proof, and non-bossy allocation mechanism is dictatorial. We further show that in three-agent economies, the allocation given by a Pareto-efficient, strategy-proof, and non-dictatorial mechanism depends only on one agent's preference who is always allocated zero consumption. That is, in ...
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作者：Miettinen, Paavo
作者单位：Bank of Finland
摘要：In this paper we consider equilibrium behavior in a Dutch (descending price) auction when the bidders are uninformed of their valuations with probability q and can acquire information about their valuation with a positive cost during the auction. We assume that the information acquisition activity is covert. We characterize the equilibrium behavior in the setting where bidders are ex-ante symmetric and have independent private values. We show that when the number of bidders is large the Dutch ...
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作者：Biglaiser, Gary; Cremer, Jacques; Dobos, Gergely
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We study a dynamic model with an incumbent monopolist and entry in every subsequent period. We first show that if all consumers have the same switching cost, then the intertemporal profits of the incumbent are the same as if there was only one period. We then study the consequences of heterogeneity of switching costs. We prove that even low switching cost customers have value for the incumbent: when there are more of them its profits increase as their presence hinders entrants who find it more...
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作者：Cerreia-Vioglio, Simone; Maccheroni, Fabio; Marinacci, Massimo; Montrucchio, Luigi
作者单位：Bocconi University; Collegio Carlo Alberto; University of Turin
摘要：Starting with the seminal paper of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) [32] an analogy between the maxmin approach of decision theory under ambiguity and the minimax approach of robust statistics - e.g., Blum and Rosenblatt (1967) [10] has been hinted at. The present paper formally clarifies this relation by showing the conditions under which the two approaches are actually equivalent. (C) 2013 Published by Elsevier Inc.
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作者：Khan, M. All; Rath, Kali P.; Sun, Yeneng; Yu, Haomiao
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; University of Notre Dame; National University of Singapore; Toronto Metropolitan University
摘要：We present a comprehensive theory of large games in which players have names and determinate social-types and/or biological traits, and identify through four decisive examples, essentially based on a matching-pennies type game, pathologies arising from the use of a Lebesgue interval for player's names. In a sufficiently general context of traits and actions, we address this dissonance by showing a saturated probability space as being a necessary and sufficient name-space for the existence and ...
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作者：Fuchs, William; Skrzypacz, Andrzej
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Stanford University
摘要：We study dynamic bargaining with asymmetric information and interdependent values. We base our analysis on the equilibria characterized by Deneckere and Liang (2006) for the gap case. We show that as the gap between the cost and value of the weakest type shrinks to zero, the continuous time limit of equilibria changes dramatically from rare bursts of trade with long periods of inactivity to smooth screening over time. In the double limit prices are independent of the shape of the distribution ...
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作者：Nunez, Marina; Rafels, Caries
作者单位：University of Barcelona
摘要：The existence of von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions (stable sets) for assignment games has been an unsolved question since Shapley and Shubik (1972) [11]. For each optimal matching between buyers and sellers, Shubik (1984) [12] proposed considering the union of the core of the game and the core of the sub-games that are compatible with this matching. We prove in the present paper that this set is the unique stable set for the assignment game that excludes third-party payments with respect to a ...
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作者：Bagues, Manuel; Perez-Villadoniga, Maria J.
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of Oviedo
摘要：In this paper we extend the standard model of statistical discrimination to a multidimensional framework where the accuracy of evaluators depends on how knowledgeable they are in each dimension. The model yields two main implications. First, candidates who excel in the same dimensions as the evaluator tend to be preferred. Second, if two equally productive groups of workers differ in their distribution of ability across dimensions group discrimination will arise unless (i) evaluators are well ...
