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作者：Hosseini, Roozbeh; Jones, Larry E.; Shourideh, Ali
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We use a Barro-Becker model of endogenous fertility, in which parents are subject to idiosyncratic shocks that are private information (either to labor productivity or taste for leisure), to study the efficient degree of consumption inequality in the long run. The planner uses the trade-off between family size and future consumption and leisure, to provide incentives for workers to reveal their shocks. We show that in this environment, the optimal dynamic contract no longer features immiserati...
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作者：Lu, Yang K.
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：This paper considers a reputation model of optimal taxation in which the public is unsure about the government type. A long-lived government can be trustworthy (meaning that it commits to its announced tax rate) or opportunistic (meaning that it retains the ability to change its tax rate after announcing it). Unlike in most prior studies, the committed strategy in this model is optimally chosen by the trustworthy type. We show that this change has significant consequences for the equilibrium d...
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作者：Mitra, Tapan; Asheim, Geir B.; Buchholz, Wolfgang; Withagen, Cees
作者单位：Cornell University; University of Oslo; University of Regensburg; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
摘要：We provide a general condition under which consumption can be sustained indefinitely bounded away from zero in the continuous time Dasgupta-Heal-Solow-Stiglitz model, by letting augmentable capital substitute for a non-renewable resource. The assumptions made on the production function are mild, thus generalizing previous work. By showing that Hartwick's rule minimizes the required resource input per unit of capital accumulation, and integrating the required resource input with respect to capi...
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作者：Seel, Christian; Strack, Philipp
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of Bonn
摘要：This paper presents a strategic model of risk-taking behavior in contests. Formally, we analyze an n-player winner-take-all contest in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brownian motion with drift. A player whose process reaches zero has to stop. The player with the highest stopping point wins. Unlike the explicit cost for a higher stopping time in a war of attrition, here, higher stopping times are riskier, because players can go bankrupt. We derive a closed-form solu...
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作者：Han, Seungjin
作者单位：McMaster University
摘要：This paper studies asymmetric first-price menu auctions in the procurement environment where the buyer does not commit to a decision rule and asymmetric sellers have interdependent costs and statistically affiliated signals. Sellers compete in bidding a menu of contracts, where a contract specifies a vector of characteristics and a payment required from the buyer for delivering these characteristics. The buyer does not commit ex-ante to a decision rule but rather upon observing all the menus o...
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作者：Nourry, Carine; Seegmuller, Thomas; Venditti, Alain
作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Universitaire de France; Universite Catholique de Lille; EDHEC Business School
摘要：We re-examine the destabilizing role of balanced-budget fiscal policy rules based on consumption taxation. Using a one-sector model with infinitely-lived households, we consider a specification of preferences derived from Jaimovich (2008) [14] and Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) [15] which is flexible enough to encompass varying degrees of income effect. When the income effect is not too large, we show that there exists a Laffer curve, which explains the multiplicity of steady states, and that non...
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作者：Galeotti, Andrea; Ghiglino, Christian; Squintani, Francesco
作者单位：University of Essex; University of Warwick
摘要：We study a model of multi-player communication. Privately informed decision makers have different preferences about the actions they take, and communicate to influence each others' actions in their favor. We prove that the equilibrium capability of any player to send a truthful message to a set of players depends not only on the preference composition of those players, but also on the number of players truthfully communicating with each one of them. We establish that the equilibrium welfare de...
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作者：Levy, Gilat; Razin, Ronny
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We consider dynamic decision making in a legislature, in which in each period legislators vote between the status quo (previous period's policy) and a new bill. However, the agenda formation process is captured by interest groups, that is, the new bill on the agenda is determined by an all-pay auction among these groups. We show that convergence to the median voter of the legislature arises if interest groups are patient enough but not necessarily otherwise. We characterize the bound on the sp...
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作者：Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
作者单位：University of London
摘要：The paper addresses the mechanism design problem of eliciting truthful information from a committee of informed experts who collude in their information disclosure strategies. It is shown that under fairly general conditions full information disclosure is possible if and only if the induced outcome is Pareto undominated for the committee members. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Dottori, Davide; Estevan, Fernanda; Shen, I-Ling
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite Catholique Louvain; University of Ottawa; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：This paper studies how the schooling system may be impacted by the number and skill type of immigrants. When the number of low-skilled immigrants is large, the education regime tends to become segregated. Wealthy locals are more likely to choose private schools and vote for a lower tax rate to finance public education. In contrast, high-skilled immigrants tend to reinforce the public system. The optimal immigration policy is highly skill-biased. The admission of high-skilled immigrants expedit...
