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作者：Jacquet, Laurence; Lehmann, Etienne; Van der Linden, Bruno
作者单位：CY Cergy Paris Universite; Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：We study optimal income taxation when labor supply reacts along the intensive and extensive margins. Individuals are heterogeneous across two unobserved dimensions: their skill and disutility of participation. We develop a new method to analytically derive conditions under which optimal marginal tax rates are non-negative everywhere. It is typically optimal to provide a distinct level of transfer to the non-employed and to workers with negligible earnings. Numerical simulations illustrate thes...
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作者：Mailath, George J.; von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Mannheim
摘要：We provide several generalizations of Mailath's (1987) [9] result that in games of asymmetric information with a continuum of types incentive compatibility plus separation implies differentiability of the informed agent's strategy. The new results extend the theory to classic models in finance such as Leland and Pyle (1977) [8], Glosten (1989) [4], and DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) [3], that were not previously covered. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Miyahara, Yasuyuki; Sekiguchi, Tadashi
作者单位：Kobe University; Kyoto University
摘要：We study finitely repeated games where players can decide whether to monitor the other players' actions or not every period. Monitoring is assumed to be costless and private. We compare our model with the standard one where the players automatically monitor each other. Since monitoring other players never hurts, any equilibrium payoff vector of a standard finitely repeated game is an equilibrium payoff vector of the same game with monitoring options. We show that some finitely repeated games w...
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作者：Zhang, Jun; Wang, Ruqu
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Queens University - Canada; Zhejiang University; Tsinghua University
摘要：In this paper, we examine the optimal mechanism design of selling an indivisible object to one regular buyer and one publicly known buyer, where inter-buyer resale cannot be prohibited. The resale market is modeled as a stochastic ultimatum bargaining game between the two buyers. We fully characterize an optimal mechanism under general conditions. Surprisingly, in this optimal mechanism, the seller never allocates the object to the regular buyer regardless of his bargaining power in the resale...
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作者：Mitra, Tapan; Sorger, Gerhard
作者单位：Cornell University; University of Vienna
摘要：Studying a one-sector economy populated by finitely many heterogeneous households that are subject to no-borrowing constraints, we confirm a conjecture by Frank P. Ramsey according to which, in the long run, society would be divided into the set of patient households who own the entire capital stock and impatient ones without any physical wealth. More specifically, we prove (i) that there exists a unique steady state equilibrium that is globally asymptotically stable and (ii) that along every ...
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作者：Sugaya, Takuo; Takahashi, Satoru
作者单位：Stanford University; National University of Singapore
摘要：Players coordinate continuation play in repeated games with public monitoring. We investigate the robustness of such equilibrium behavior with respect to ex-ante small private-monitoring perturbations. We show that with full support of public signals, no perfect public equilibrium is robust if it induces a regular 2 x 2 coordination game in the continuation play. This regularity condition is violated in all belief-free equilibria. Indeed, with an individual full rank condition, every interior ...
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作者：Korpela, Ville
作者单位：University of Turku
摘要：In an important step forward Maskin [E. Maskin, Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality, Rev. Econ. Stud. 66 (1999) 23-38] showed that two properties - monotonicity and no veto power - are together sufficient for Nash implementation. In contrast to the vast literature that followed, this characterization has two major advantages: First, it is often easy to verify, and second, it has an elegant and simple interpretation. However, there does not exist a similar condition for social choice corres...
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作者：Acharya, Avidit; Ortner, Juan
作者单位：University of Rochester; Boston University
摘要：We model a situation in which two players bargain over two pies, one of which can only be consumed starting at a future date. Suppose the players value the pies asymmetrically: one player values the existing pie more than the future one, while the other player has the opposite valuation. We show that players may consume only a fraction of the existing pie in the first period, and then consume the remainder of it, along with the second pie, at the date at which the second pie becomes available ...
