Asymmetric first-price menu auctions under intricate uncertainty

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Han, Seungjin
• 署名单位: McMaster University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.014
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 2068-2095
• 关键词: First-price menu auction; interdependent values; Monotone equilibria; Joint ex-post renegotiation proofness; Ex-ante robustness

摘要

This paper studies asymmetric first-price menu auctions in the procurement environment where the buyer does not commit to a decision rule and asymmetric sellers have interdependent costs and statistically affiliated signals. Sellers compete in bidding a menu of contracts, where a contract specifies a vector of characteristics and a payment required from the buyer for delivering these characteristics. The buyer does not commit ex-ante to a decision rule but rather upon observing all the menus offered by sellers chooses the best contract. This paper establishes the existence of a continuum of separating monotone equilibria in this game bounded above by the jointly ex-post efficient outcome and below by the jointly interim efficient outcome. It shows that the jointly ex-post efficient equilibrium outcome is the only ex-post renegotiation-proof outcome and it is also ex-ante robust to all continuation equilibria. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.