Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Artemov, Georgy; Kunimoto, Takashi; Serrano, Roberto
• 署名单位: University of Melbourne; Hitotsubashi University; Brown University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.015
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 424-447
• 关键词: Wilson doctrine; mechanism design; Robust virtual implementation; triangle-rationalizability; incentive compatibility; Measurability; Type diversity

摘要

We study a mechanism design problem where arbitrary restrictions are placed on the sets of first-order beliefs of agents. Calling these restrictions A, we use triangle-rationalizability (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2003, [5]) as our solution concept, and require that a mechanism virtually implement a socially desirable outcome. We obtain two necessary conditions, A-incentive compatibility and is-measurability and show that the latter is satisfied as long as a particular zero-measure set of first-order beliefs is ruled out. In environments allowing small transfers of utility among agents, these two conditions are also sufficient. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.