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作者：Gilboa, Itzhak; Samuelson, Larry; Schmeidler, David
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Yale University; Yale University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Reichman University
摘要：We present a model of inductive inference that includes, as special cases, Bayesian reasoning, case-based reasoning, and rule-based reasoning. This unified framework allows us to examine how the various modes of inductive inference can be combined and how their relative weights change endogenously. For example, we establish conditions under which an agent who does not know the structure of the data generating process will decrease, over the course of her reasoning, the weight of credence put o...
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作者：Mariotti, Marco; Veneziani, Roberto
作者单位：University of St Andrews; University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：We study a principle of `Non-Interference' in social welfare judgements. Non-Interference captures aspects of liberal approaches (particularly a Millian approach) to social decision making. In its full generality, Non-Interference produces an impossibility result: together with Weak Pareto Optimality, it implies that a social welfare ordering must be dictatorial. However, interesting restricted versions of Non-Interference are compatible with standard social welfare orderings. (C) 2013 Elsevie...
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作者：Scheuer, Florian
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：In many countries, taxes on businesses are less progressive than labor income taxes. This paper provides a justification for this pattern based on adverse selection that entrepreneurs face in credit markets. Individuals choose between becoming entrepreneurs or workers and differ in their skill in both of these occupations. I find that endogenous cross-subsidization in the credit market equilibrium results in excessive (insufficient) entry of low-skilled (high-skilled) agents into entrepreneurs...
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作者：Noor, Jawwad
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：In formalizing a 'veil of ignorance' type procedure, this paper considers how an agent's preferences over a set of alternatives change as he is placed at an increasing 'distance' from the consequences of his choices. A definition for such 'removed preferences' is presented and its properties studied. As an application, it is demonstrated that present biased agents are 'essentially' exponential when distanced from the present, and that rank-dependent expected utility agents are 'essentially' ex...
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作者：Holmberg, Par; Newbery, David; Ralph, Daniel
作者单位：Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); University of Cambridge; University of Cambridge
摘要：In most electricity markets generators must submit step-function offers to a uniform price auction. These markets are often modelled as simpler pure-strategy Supply Function Equilibria (SFE) with continuous supply functions. Critics argue that the discreteness and discontinuity of the required steps drastically change Nash equilibria, invalidating predictions of the SFE model. We prove that there are sufficient conditions, offered quantities can be continuously varied, offered prices are selec...
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作者：Dana, Rose-Anne; Riedel, Frank
作者单位：Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; University of Bielefeld
摘要：We study a dynamic and infinite-dimensional model with incomplete multiple prior preferences. In interior efficient allocations, agents share a common risk-adjusted prior and subjective interest rate. Interior efficient allocations and equilibria coincide with those of economies with subjective expected utility and priors from the agents' multiple prior sets. A specific model with neither risk nor uncertainty at the aggregate level is considered. Risk is always fully insured. For small levels ...
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作者：Campos, Rodolfo G.
作者单位：University of Navarra; IESE Business School
摘要：I add heterogeneous agents and risk-sharing opportunities to a global game of regime change. The novel insight is that when there is a risk-sharing motive, fundamentals drive not only individual behavior, but also select which individuals are more relevant for the likelihood of a crisis because of endogenous shifts in wealth. If attacking is relatively safe, attack behavior in the global game and trade in state-contingent assets feed back into each other. This feedback implies that multiple eq...
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作者：Carlier, G.; Dana, R. -A.
作者单位：Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
摘要：An exchange economy in which agents have convex incomplete preferences defined by families of concave utility functions is considered. Sufficient conditions for the set of efficient allocations and equilibria to coincide with the set of efficient allocations and equilibria that result when each agent has a utility in her family are provided. Welfare theorems in an incomplete preferences framework therefore hold under these conditions and efficient allocations and equilibria are characterized b...
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作者：Johnson, T. R.
作者单位：University of Notre Dame
摘要：Using a mechanism design framework, we characterize how a profit-maximizing intermediary can design matching markets when each agent is privately informed about his quality as a partner. Sufficient conditions are provided that ensure a version of positive assortative matching (what we call truncated positive assortative matching) maximizes profits. Under these conditions, all-pay position auctions always implement the profit-maximizing allocation. Winners-pay position auctions, however, only d...
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作者：Cho, In-Koo; Matsui, Akihiko
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Tokyo
摘要：We investigate a canonical search-theoretic model without entry. Two agents are randomly matched with a long side being rationed. The matched agents face a pair of randomly drawn non-transferable payoffs, and then choose whether or not to form a partnership subject to a small probability of exogenous break down. As this probability and friction vanish, the Nash bargaining solution emerges as the unique undominated strategy equilibrium outcome if the mass of each party is the same. If the size ...
