Strategic stability in Poisson games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: De Sinopoli, Francesco; Meroni, Claudia; Pimienta, Carlos
• 署名单位: University of Verona; University of Milano-Bicocca; University of New South Wales Sydney
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.05.005
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 46-63
• 关键词: Poisson games; voting; perfect equilibrium; Strategic stability; Stable sets

摘要

In Poisson games, an extension of perfect equilibrium based on perturbations of the strategy space does not guarantee that players use admissible actions. This observation suggests that such a class of perturbations is not the correct one. We characterize the right space of perturbations to define perfect equilibrium in Poisson games. Furthermore, we use such a space to define the corresponding strategically stable sets of equilibria. We show that they satisfy existence, admissibility, and robustness against iterated deletion of dominated strategies and inferior replies. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.