-
作者：Dutta, Prajit K.; Siconolfi, Paolo
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：This paper studies asynchronous dynamic games with one period ahead transfers. There is a unique equilibrium that coincides with the Utilitarian Pareto Optimum whenever the horizon is finite. With an infinite horizon, the same result holds when action history dependence is allowed but not history dependence on transfers. The result is restored with a finite but costly memory of transfers as well as with continuous transfer strategies. Multiplicity can arise from strategies that have an infinit...
-
作者：Guo, Huiyi
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：This paper introduces ambiguous transfers to the problems of full surplus extraction and implementation in finite dimensional naive type spaces. The mechanism designer commits to one transfer rule but informs agents of a set of potential ones. Without knowing the adopted transfer rule, agents are assumed to make decisions based on the worst-case expected payoffs. A key condition in this paper is the Beliefs Determine Preferences (BDP) property, which requires an agent to hold distinct beliefs ...
-
作者：Cettolin, Elena; Riedl, Arno
作者单位：Tilburg University; Maastricht University
摘要：We present a set of experiments testing for incomplete preferences due to uncertainty. In a first experiment, we observe that approximately half of the participants exhibit a choice pattern inconsistent with models assuming complete preferences and Certainty Independence (CI). To understand these participants' behavior, in a second experiment, we design a decision task that distinguishes between models assuming complete preferences and relaxing CI and models of incomplete preferences under unc...
-
作者：Keller, Godfrey; Novak, Vladimir; Willems, Tim
作者单位：University of Oxford; Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; International Monetary Fund
摘要：In a standard two-armed bandit setup, this paper shows - counterintuitively - that a more risk-averse decision maker might be more willing to take risky actions. The reason relates to the fact that pulling the risky arm in bandit models produces information on the environment - thereby reducing the risk that a decision maker will face in the future. This finding gives reason for caution when inferring risk preferences from observed actions: in a bandit setup, observing a greater appetite for r...
-
作者：Nicolo, Antonio; Sen, Arunava; Yadav, Sonal
作者单位：University of Padua; University of Manchester; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; Umea University
摘要：We propose a model where agents are matched in pairs in order to undertake a project. Agents have preferences over both the partner and the project they are assigned to. These preferences over partners and projects are separable and dichotomous. Each agent partitions the set of partners into friends and outsiders, and the set of projects into good and bad ones. Friendship is mutual and transitive. In addition, preferences over projects among friends are correlated (homophily). We define a suit...
-
作者：Lou, Youcheng; Parsa, Sahar; Ray, Debraj; Li, Duan; Wang, Shouyang
作者单位：Chinese Academy of Sciences; Tufts University; New York University; University of Warwick; City University of Hong Kong; Chinese Academy of Sciences; Chinese Academy of Sciences; University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, CAS
摘要：We study a financial market with asymmetric, multidimensional trader signals that have general correlation structure. Each of a continuum of traders belongs to one of finitely many information groups. There is a multidimensional aggregate signal for each group. Each trader observes an idiosyncratic signal about the fundamental, built from this group signal. Correlations across group signals are arbitrary. Several existing models serve as special cases, and new applications become possible. We ...
-
作者：Nehring, Klaus; Pivato, Marcus
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis; CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：Which is the best, impartially most plausible consensus view to serve as the basis of democratic group decision when voters disagree? Assuming that the judgment aggregation problem can be framed as a matter of judging a set of binary propositions (issues), we develop a multi-issue majoritarian approach based on the criterion of supermajority efficiency (SME). SME reflects the idea that smaller supermajorities must yield to larger supermajorities so as to obtain better supported, more plausible...
-
作者：Nimark, Kristoffer P.; Pitschner, Stefan
作者单位：Cornell University; Uppsala University
摘要：No agent has the resources to monitor all events that are potentially relevant for his decisions. Therefore, many delegate their information choice to specialized news providers that monitor the world on their behalf and report only a curated selection of events. We document empirically that, while different outlets typically emphasize different topics, major events shift the general news focus and make coverage more homogeneous. We propose a theoretical framework that formalizes this type of ...
-
作者：Chan, Jimmy; Gupta, Seher; Li, Fei; Wang, Yun
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong; New York University; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Xiamen University
摘要：A sender seeks to persuade a group of heterogeneous voters to adopt an action. We analyze the sender's information-design problem when the collective decision is made through a majority vote and voting for the action is personally costly. We show that the sender can exploit the heterogeneity in voting costs by privately communicating with the voters. Under the optimal information structure, voters with lower costs are more likely to vote for the sender's preferred action when it is the wrong c...
-
作者：Lang, Matthias
作者单位：University of Munich; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：Consider managers evaluating their employees' performances. Should managers justify their subjective evaluations? Suppose a manager's evaluation is private information. Justifying her evaluation is costly but limits the principal's scope for distorting her evaluation of the employee. I show that the manager justifies her evaluation if and only if the employee's performance was poor. The justification assures the employee that the manager has not distorted the evaluation downwards. For good per...
