School choice with vouchers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Afacan, Mustafa Oguz
• 署名单位: Sabanci University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.10.013
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 57-72
• 关键词: Voucher; school choice; matching; STABILITY; EFFICIENCY; strategy-proofness

摘要

We introduce a novel school-choice with vouchers model. A feasibility notion is defined to incorporate the constraint that students from low-income families need a voucher to go to a private school. We then introduce a stability notion, while emphasizing that the traditional school-choice model and usual stability notion are realized as a special case of our formulation. A class of feasible, stable, and constrained efficient mechanisms is proposed. However, feasibility and stability are incompatible with strategy-proofness in the sense that no mechanism is feasible, stable, and strategy-proof at the same time, implying that any mechanism in our class is manipulable. Given the efficiency and strategic disadvantages of stability, as an alternative solution, we introduce a feasible, efficient, and strategy-proof mechanism. Lastly, we provide a comparative statics analysis. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.