Constrained implementation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hayashi, Takashi; Lombardi, Michele
• 署名单位: University of Glasgow
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.06.007
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 546-567
• 关键词: Constrained implementation; mechanism design; Nash implementation

摘要

Consider a society with two sectors (issues or objects) that faces a design problem. Suppose that the sector-2 dimension of the design problem is fixed and represented by a mechanism Gamma(2), and that the designer operates under this constraint for institutional reasons. A sector-1 mechanism Gamma(1) constrained implements a social choice rule phi in Nash equilibrium if for each profile of agents' preferences, the set of (pure) Nash equilibrium outcomes of the mechanism Gamma(1) x Gamma(2) played by agents with those preferences always coincides with the recommendations made by phi for that profile. If this mechanism design exercise could be accomplished, phi would be constrained implementable. We show that constrained monotonicity, a strengthening of (Maskin) monotonicity, is a necessary condition for constrained implementation. When there are more than two agents, and when the designer can use the private information elicited from agents via Gamma(2) to make a socially optimal decision for sector 1, constrained monotonicity, combined with an auxiliary condition, is sufficient. This sufficiency result does not rule out any kind of complementarity between the two sectors. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.