Communication on networks and strong reliability

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Laclau, Marie; Renou, Ludovic; Venel, Xavier
• 署名单位: Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of London; Queen Mary University London; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Luiss Guido Carli University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105822
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: Cheap talk; Direct; Mediated; COMMUNICATION; protocol; network

摘要

We consider sender-receiver games, where the sender and the receiver are two distant nodes in a communication network. We show that if the network has two disjoint paths of communication between the sender and the receiver, then we can replicate all equilibrium outcomes not only of the direct communication game (i.e., when the sender and the receiver communicate directly with each other) but also of the mediated game (i.e., when the sender and the receiver communicate with the help of a mediator).