A tractable group all-pay auction

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barbieri, Stefano; Topolyan, Iryna
• 署名单位: Tulane University; University System of Ohio; University of Cincinnati
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106016
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: All-pay auction; correlated equilibrium; Constant elasticity of substitution

摘要

We consider group all-pay auctions with a wide range of effort complementarity in which teammates coordinate efforts via a group-specific correlation device. Under mild regularity conditions, there is a unique equilibrium effort distribution, independent of the distribution correlation device. We characterize this unique distribution of efforts and analyze the effects value dispersion, degree of complementarity, and group size. We show that this effort distribution can be achieved without correlation devices as the equilibrium outcome of a cheap talk game which players engage in costless unmediated preplay communication.