Evolving wars of attrition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gieczewski, German
• 署名单位: Princeton University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.105967
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: War of attrition; Concessions; equilibrium selection; Evolving state

摘要

This paper models a war of attrition that evolves over time. Two players fight over a prize until one surrenders. The flow costs of fighting depend on a state variable that is public but changes stochastically as the war unfolds. In the unique equilibrium, each player surrenders when the state becomes adverse enough; for intermediate states, both players fight on. In an extension, the baseline model is augmented to allow for unilateral concessions of part of the prize. Such concessions can be beneficial if they disproportionately sap the opponent's incentive to fight. The evolving war of attrition with concessions yields predictions regarding delay and the eventual division of the prize that differ from conventional models of bargaining as well as reputational wars of attrition.