Information requirements for mechanism design

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: McLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew
• 署名单位: Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106056
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: robustness; Optimal auctions; incentive compatibility; mechanism design; interdependent values; Informational size; common knowledge

摘要

Standard mechanism design begins with a statement of the problem, including knowledge on the designer's part about the distribution of the characteristics (preferences and information) of the participants who are to engage with the mechanism. There is a large literature on robust mechanism design, much of which aims to reduce the assumed information the designer has about the participants. In this paper we provide an auction mechanism for interdependent value problems that performs well when there are many buyers, even though there is no prior distribution over the accuracy of buyers' information on the part of the designer or the participants.