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作者：Baughman, Garth
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
摘要：Deadlines and fixed end dates are pervasive in matching markets. Deadlines drive fundamental non-stationarity and complexity in behavior, generating significant departures from the steadystate equilibria usually studied in the search and matching literature. I consider a two-sided matching market with search frictions where vertically differentiated agents attempt to form bilateral matches before a deadline. I give novel proofs of existence and uniqueness of equilibria, and show that all equil...
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作者：Lu, Zhuoran
作者单位：Shanghai Jiao Tong University
摘要：This paper studies a signaling model in which a strategic player can manipulate the cost of signaling. A seller chooses a price scheme for a good, and a buyer with a hidden type chooses how much to purchase as a signal to receivers. When receivers observe the price scheme, the seller charges monopoly prices, and the buyer purchases less than the first best. In contrast, when receivers do not observe the price scheme, the demand for signals is more elastic. In equilibrium, the seller charges lo...
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作者：Smith, Eric
作者单位：University of Essex
摘要：This paper assesses wage setting and wage dynamics in a search and matching framework where (i) workers and firms on occasion can meet multilaterally; (ii) workers can recall previous encounters with firms; and (iii) firms cannot commit to future wages and workers cannot commit to not searching in the future. The resulting progression of wages (from firms paying just enough to keep their workers) yields a compensation structure consistent with well established but difficult to reconcile observ...
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作者：Karp, Larry; Schmidt, Robert C.; Simon, Leo; Streekstra, Leanne
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Fern University Hagen
摘要：We introduce a novel continuous-time framework for analyzing two-player games. Each player can move at most once, choosing an action along with its timing. We introduce assumptions that allow for a natural representation of such games, and establish results on the relation between discrete and continuous time. Unlike in Simon and Stinchcombe (1989), action sets are compact subsets of Rn (rather than finite). This substantially increases the scope for applications. For illustration, we analyze ...
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作者：Jungbauer, Thomas; Waldman, Michael
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：For many signaling applications, the real-world scenario fails to match the model setup. Actions are often unobservable but combine with the sender's type to determine an observable signal. Introducing a theory of generalized signaling, we show the nature of equilibria can fundamentally differ from the canonical signaling model. In fact, we find both over-and under-investment arise in important signaling environments. Our model extends to multiple actions and signal jamming environments with i...
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作者：Kreutzkamp, Sophie; Lou, Yichuan
作者单位：University of Manchester; University of Tokyo
摘要：We study a persuasion model with limited commitment in which the sender can commit to a signal ex ante but not to truthful reporting ex post. Sender-optimal signals exploit a key trade-off: although better-quality information allows the sender to communicate more precisely, it adversely affects the credibility of his messages. Building on this observation, we provide sufficient and necessary conditions for the sender to strictly benefit from obtaining an imperfect signal. Under linear preferen...
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作者：Xu, Zhihao; Yu, Changhua
作者单位：Emory University; Peking University
摘要：This paper studies optimal monetary policy in a multisector economy with input-output linkages and distortions. Our model incorporates both the supply side and the demand side effects of monetary policy. We derive a tractable sufficient statistic for the supply side effect, which comprises two reallocation channels resulting from substitution between sectoral products for households and firms, and substitution between labor and intermediate inputs in production. The optimal monetary policy ind...
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作者：Bervoets, Sebastian; Makihara, Kohmei
作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We consider public goods games with heterogeneous players interacting on a network and investigate how shocks to players' characteristics and changes in interaction patterns influence individual and total contributions. We introduce a linear system associated to the initial game, in which heterogeneity in players' characteristics is removed and interactions between players are reversed, and show that what matters in determining the effects of a shock on contributions is the sign of the coordin...
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作者：Cheung, Paul H. Y.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：We propose and characterize the General Reciprocity Model in a framework of context-dependent choice. In the model, the second mover can establish their own rules regarding when or why to reciprocate. The model disentangles the baseline social preference from reciprocity: reciprocity occurs when people deviate from their baseline preference due to the context in which the first mover's choice is made. Our model provides a condition to reveal reciprocity, which aligns with the standard model-fr...
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作者：Barbieri, Stefano; Topolyan, Iryna
作者单位：Tulane University; University System of Ohio; University of Cincinnati
摘要：We consider group all-pay auctions with a wide range of effort complementarity in which teammates coordinate efforts via a group-specific correlation device. Under mild regularity conditions, there is a unique equilibrium effort distribution, independent of the distribution correlation device. We characterize this unique distribution of efforts and analyze the effects value dispersion, degree of complementarity, and group size. We show that this effort distribution can be achieved without corr...
