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作者：Kimya, Mert
作者单位：University of Sydney
摘要：A credible set is the set of stable states of an expectation satisfying internal and external stability as defined in Dutta and Vohra (2017). We show that credible sets are characterized by two fundamental coalitional rationality axioms: basic coalitional rationality and farsighted rationality. Credible sets exist in a wide range of environments, including all finite games, and they provide a unifying framework for organizing prominent notions in the farsighted stability literature. Influentia...
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作者：Carmona, Guilherme; Laohakunakorn, Krittanai
作者单位：University of Surrey
摘要：We analyze a monopoly pricing model where information about the buyer's valuation is endogenous. Before the seller sets a price, both the buyer and the seller receive private signals that may be informative about the buyer's valuation. The joint distribution of these signals, as a function of the valuation, is optimally chosen by the players. In general, players have conflicting incentives over the provision of information. As a modelling device, we assume that an aggregation function determin...
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作者：Guasoni, Paolo; Weber, Marko Hans
作者单位：Dublin City University; University of Bologna; National University of Singapore
摘要：This paper examines the implications of unhedgeable fundamental risk, combined with agents' heterogeneous preferences and wealth allocations, on dynamic asset pricing and portfolio choice. We solve in closed form a continuous-time general equilibrium model in which unhedgeable fundamental risk affects aggregate consumption dynamics, rendering the market incomplete. Several long-lived agents with heterogeneous risk-aversion and time-preference make consumption and investment decisions, trading ...
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作者：Sockin, Michael
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：A key function of financial intermediaries is to borrow in financial markets and lend to firms. I show that this creates informational linkages between repo and corporate bond markets. My key result is improving transparency in either market may lower welfare even if funding liquidity improves. My model's predictions are consistent with the bond and repo market dysfunction during the 2008 global financial and COVID-19 crises, and the impact of the introduction of TRACE on bond markets in 2002....
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作者：Dziewulski, Pawel
作者单位：University of Sussex
摘要：We develop a revealed preference method for studying preferences of individuals whose choices may be inconsistent with utility maximisation. We show that acyclicity of the strict revealed preference is necessary and sufficient for the data to be rationalisable with approximate utility maximisation. In this model, an alternative is selected from a menu only if its utility is not significantly lower than that of any other available option. This allows us to test for consumer behaviour that is su...
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作者：Yildirim, Huseyin
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：This paper examines incentives in teams of career-concerned members, where effort and talent can be substitutes (Holmstr & ouml;m, 1999) or complements (Dewatripont et al., 1999). It is shown that the degree of effort-talent complementarity determines which team member exerts more effort and thus gains or loses more reputation following team performance. The paper argues that organizations can boost incentives by promoting concern for collective reputation. Strategies to achieve this include f...
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作者：Hafalir, Isa E.; Kojima, Fuhito; Yenmez, M. Bumin
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney; University of Tokyo; Washington University (WUSTL); Durham University
摘要：Given an initial matching and a policy objective on the distribution of agent types to institutions, we study the existence of a mechanism that weakly improves the distributional objective and satisfies constrained efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness. Such a mechanism need not exist in general. We introduce a new notion of discrete concavity, which we call pseudo M#-concavity, and construct a mechanism with the desirable properties when the distributional objective satis...
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作者：Alon, Titan; Fershtman, Daniel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; Emory University
摘要：This paper generalizes the canonical model of human capital accumulation through schooling to endogenize the process of academic specialization. It provides the solution to a class of dynamic investment problems with switching and stopping under sequential uncertainty. Under mild assumptions, the model's optimal policy has a particularly simple form that can be reduced to the comparison of independent indices. The optimal policy implies that schooling should begin with a period of general educ...
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作者：Li, Xuelin; Szydlowski, Martin; Yu, Fangyuan
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We study dynamic Bayesian persuasion in an entry game. A sender publicly reveals information to an adopter and a competitor who decide when to irreversibly enter or exit a market. When the sender's loss from competition is small, the sender first provides information to attract the adopter, and then aims to reveal sufficiently negative information to deter the competitor. Otherwise, the optimal policy is reversed. The sender first aims to provide negative information to deter the competitor an...
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作者：Goto, Hiroshi; Ma, Yan; Takeuchi, Nobuyuki
作者单位：Chiba University; Kobe University; University of Marketing & Distribution Sciences
摘要：We develop a two-sector model to explore how skill distribution affects trade in final goods and offshoring. We show that when countries differ in skill abundance, wage disparities create opportunities for offshoring. In contrast, when countries vary in skill diversity but share the same median skill, symmetric skill distributions render offshoring infeasible. We also find that offshoring can result in the relative price under offshoring being lower than each country's autarky relative price i...
