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作者：HENDERSHOTT, PH; WON, YH
摘要：Portfolio-based general equilibrium models are useful for analyzing the interaction between the structure of individual tax rates and the way particular assets are taxed, for considering the role of differential tax rules and risk in determining household portfolio choices, and for addressing distributional questions. Unfortunately, current versions of these models give housing short shrift, owner housing is assumed to be riskless, rental housing is not a separately identifiable asset, and ten...
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作者：KEMP, MC; VANLONG, N
作者单位：McGill University; Australian National University
摘要：It is argued that in strictly egalitarian economies, there is an equilibrium in which social well-being is maximized and that this is so whatever the nature of returns to scale and whether or not the economy is characterized by elements of monopoly, externalities of consumption or production, commodity taxes or subsidies, or the private provision of public goods. As a corollary, the implications of distortions and increasing returns can be effectively studied only in a context of inequality.
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作者：HUIZINGA, H
摘要：This paper investigates the tax treatment by national governments of R&D expenditures of multinational enterprises. In a noncooperative world, the international tax system is generally shown to discourage R&D investments by multinational firms. For the special case of symmetric corporate tax rates, the multinational is allowed to expense less than the total of its R&D expenses worldwide. Internationalization of the firm's operations and ownership is demonstrated to lead to less generous expens...
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作者：CHANDER, P; WILDE, L
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We extend the game-theoretic model of Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde (1986) to allow for corruption in tax administration. In the presence of corruption audit rates are generally higher than in its absence. In fact, in the presence of corruption it is possible to sustain equilibria in which all returns are audited. Moreover, when some auditors accept bribes it is possible for increases in the fine rate or the tax rate to reduce expected government revenue.
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作者：IHORI, T
摘要：This paper extends previous models of non-cooperative private funding of pure public goods by allowing for impure public goods. The analysis is developed in the context of international public goods. Under certain conditions the consequences of transfers on utility are paradoxical. If the preferences are divergent, a country may gain by giving a transfer, the receiver may lose, and these two phenomena may appear at the same time.
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作者：DELIPALLA, S; KEEN, M
作者单位：University of Essex; Swansea University
摘要：This paper compares ad valorem and specific taxation in two models of oligopoly, with and without free entry. Predominantly ad valorem taxation implies a relatively low consumer price, high tax revenue and (when entry is precluded) low profits. Ad valorem taxation dominates specific taxation from the welfare perspective: the set of circumstances under which (with free entry) specific taxation raises welfare is a strict subset of that in which ad valorem taxation is welfare-improving, and in bo...
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作者：BASU, K; BHATTACHARYA, S; MISHRA, A
摘要：Existing models of corruption that allow for bribery have ignored an important recursive problem. When an auditor or a policeman bargains over a bribe with a person he has arrested, he has to take into account the fact that he may, in turn, be caught for taking this bribe and be involved in a similar bargain, but from the other side. The purpose of this paper is to provide a simple model for capturing this recursion. Having done so, it goes on to analyse some conditions for the control of corr...
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作者：CROCKER, KJ; SNOW, A
作者单位：University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：When agents possess imperfect hidden knowledge at the time contracts are negotiated, the social value of agents having access to additional hidden knowledge before contracts are implemented is positive to the extent that incentive-constrained agents are sorted more finely, but is negative to the extent that incentive-constraining agents impose more stringent signalling requirements on others. Hence, the intuition developed by Hirshleifer (1971), Marshall (1974), and Milgrom and Stokey (1982), ...
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作者：FORTIN, B; LANOIE, P
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：This paper extends the literature on post-injury duration of absence from work by developing a model that incorporates substitution between unemployment insurance benefits and workers' compensation. A theoretical analysis is presented in which the worker maximizes expected utility over four possible states of nature. The model is tested empirically using pooled cross-section and time-series data at the two-digit industry level. The main findings support the predictions of the model: an increas...
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作者：GANDERTON, PT
摘要：It is possible that government subsidies to higher education, disbursed in kind, can produce the anomalous result of reducing the consumption of the good being subsidized. In this paper, I employ individual and college data to estimate the effect of such subsidies on students' choices of college quality. Empirical estimates from a switching regression model with correction for the joint decisions to apply to college and choose the public or private sector are presented. Predictions from the mo...
