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作者：COATS, RM; DALTON, TR
作者单位：Southern University System; Southern University New Orleans
摘要：Lott (1986, 1987a) argues that brand names can be barriers to entry in political markets because political brand names cannot be sold. Our empirical model examines the effect of inalienability of political capital on entry into nineteenth-century British political markets. We test the hypothesis that since county races were more expensive than borough races owing to greater costs of information, the level of non-transferable investment produced by a given number of past campaigns was greater i...
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作者：OTSUKI, M
摘要：The application of distributive equity has been confined to the allocation of private goods. This paper extends this application to economics with public goods. After the surplus accruing from publicness in consumption of public goods is defined and quantified, we show: (1) There exists an efficient allocation such that the surplus from publicness as well as all of the resources available are equitably distributed. (2) The surplus from publicness fails to be equitably distributed in Lindahl eq...
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作者：MUSGRAVE, RA
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：This paper develops the proposition that the normative design of a good tax system depends on the ethical premise or social contract on which society is taken to operate. This thesis is applied to Lockean entitlement to earnings with its corollary of benefit taxation and to the utilitarian model with its counterpart of maximum welfare or least total sacrifice. Fairness rules including maximin are also noted. For each case the role of tax avoidance and resulting deadweight loss is examined and ...
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作者：SWENSON, CW
摘要：The effectiveness of the tax credit for research and experimentation (R&E) expenditures is examined using a panel of firm data for the period 1975 through 1988. Using a structural model, the results generally indicate that the credit resulted in increased R&E spending. However, the effect of the credit was substantially mitigated by the impacts of net operating loss carryovers and low growth opportunities. Results also indicate some degree of decreased R&E spending as a result of debt restruct...
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作者：TURNBULL, GK
摘要：The flypaper effect is the empirical observation that increases in intergovernmental aid stimulate greater local government expenditure than do increases in voter income. Fiscal illusion provides a widely accepted explanation for this asymmetry. Models of voter behavior under fiscal illusion typically assume that taxpayers consistently misperceive nonstochastic average for marginal tax prices. This paper develops an alternative framework in which rational voters recognize marginal tax prices b...
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作者：BUITER, WH; PATEL, UR
作者单位：International Monetary Fund
摘要：The paper studies the solvency of the Indian public sector and the eventual monetization and inflation that would be implied by stabilization of the debt-GNP ratio in the absence of changes in the primary deficit. The nonstationarity of the discounted public debt suggests that indefinite continuation of the pattern of behavior reflected in the historical time-series process is inconsistent with the maintenance of solvency. This message is reinforced by the recent behavior of the debt-GNP ratio...
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作者：FRASER, CD
摘要：This note provides an alternative, elementary proof of Bergstrom, Blume and Varian's well-known result on the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the private provision of a public good when all goods are normal.
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作者：GEORGAKOPOULOS, T
作者单位：University of York - UK; University of York - UK
摘要：This paper shows that trade deflection is not the administrative aspect of the restricted origin principle, as suggested in the literature, but an important analytical issue that bears on resource allocation. When deflection is taken into account, trade distortions are avoided only when either domestic or, at least, border tax adjustment rates are equal in the member countries and trade balances are in bilateral equilibrium. The control of deflection via rules of destination causes trade disto...
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作者：TAYLOR, L
摘要：This paper models jurisdictions that compete for an industry by building infrastructure more rapidly than their identical neighbors. Such competition can waste resources. Lucrative 'prizes' - the tax revenues and the value of jobs that an incoming firm would provide - stimulate infrastructural spending and waste. Low initial levels of infrastructure discourage infrastructural competition. The paper urges a cautious approach toward federal subsidies of local expenditures on infrastructure.
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作者：EBERT, U
摘要：This paper investigates Mirrlees' model of optimal income taxation. It provides a concrete example of utility and density functions for which the solution to the usual (first-order) model is not implementable, i.e. an example where the first-order approach does not work. Adding second-order conditions leads to an extended model and to implementable solutions. If these conditions are binding one gets a kink in the optimal net-income schedule and bunching of individuals occurs. The properties of...
