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作者：COATS, RM; DALTON, TR
作者单位：Southern University System; Southern University New Orleans
摘要：Lott (1986, 1987a) argues that brand names can be barriers to entry in political markets because political brand names cannot be sold. Our empirical model examines the effect of inalienability of political capital on entry into nineteenth-century British political markets. We test the hypothesis that since county races were more expensive than borough races owing to greater costs of information, the level of non-transferable investment produced by a given number of past campaigns was greater i...
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作者：OTSUKI, M
摘要：The application of distributive equity has been confined to the allocation of private goods. This paper extends this application to economics with public goods. After the surplus accruing from publicness in consumption of public goods is defined and quantified, we show: (1) There exists an efficient allocation such that the surplus from publicness as well as all of the resources available are equitably distributed. (2) The surplus from publicness fails to be equitably distributed in Lindahl eq...
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作者：EBERT, U
摘要：This paper investigates Mirrlees' model of optimal income taxation. It provides a concrete example of utility and density functions for which the solution to the usual (first-order) model is not implementable, i.e. an example where the first-order approach does not work. Adding second-order conditions leads to an extended model and to implementable solutions. If these conditions are binding one gets a kink in the optimal net-income schedule and bunching of individuals occurs. The properties of...
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作者：ROEMER, JE; SILVESTRE, J
摘要：The cost function of a monopoly is C(q) = K + theta-q, where theta is unknown to the regulator. We evaluate various ownership and regulation regimes in terms of social welfare, determined by both the amount of total surplus and its distribution. Maximal welfare is achieved by the regulated public firm when its bias is pro-consumer, and also when it is pro-worker and theta is low enough. We compare an unregulated public firm with a private one regulated a la Loeb-Magat-Baron-Myerson and charact...
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作者：BAGNOLI, M; BENDAVID, S; MCKEE, M
作者单位：University of New Mexico
摘要：This paper reports the results of a series of experiments designed to test the predictions of a model of voluntary provision of public goods through private contributions. The particular voluntary contribution game implements the core in successively undominated perfect equilibria, but the behavioral question is whether the agents adopt strategies which support this refinement to the Nash equilibrium. The experimental evidence suggests that they do not: core allocations do not consistently occ...
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作者：ALM, J; MCCLELLAND, GH; SCHULZE, WD
摘要：Why do people pay taxes when they have an opportunity, even an incentive, to evade? The experimental results in this paper suggest that tax compliance occurs because some individuals overweight the low probability of audit, although such overweighting is not universal. The results also indicate that compliance does not occur simply because individuals believe that evasion is wrong, since subject behavior is unchanged by the use of either neutral or loaded terms. Finally, there is evidence that...
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作者：DOWNS, TW
摘要：A growing body of literature analyzes the variation in Q, the ratio of financial market value to asset current replacement cost, and makes inferences about attributes such as monopoly power, profitability, managerial performance, etc. These studies ignore potential biases embedded in Q that result from non-neutral tax policies. This study examines the association between Q and tax biases and establishes that differences in accumulated depreciation tax shields explain significant variation in Q...
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作者：ANDREONI, J
摘要：This paper considers a simple dynamic model of tax compliance in which people may face binding borrowing constraints. The model leads to much different conclusions and policy recommendations than static models. In particular, the government cannot generate full compliance by setting the expected value of cheating to be negative. Also, it is possible for the government to set penalties in a way that will increase tax revenue over that of full compliance. The government can increase welfare by p...
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作者：SUMNER, M
摘要：The effects of three pre-announced changes in fiscal policy on manufacturing investment in equipment and in industrial buildings are estimated using the Engel-Granger two-step procedure. The strong seasonal variation in the expenditure series is interpreted as an economic process within the same framework.
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作者：BOADWAY, R; BRUCE, N
摘要：This paper analyzes income tax integration in a small open economy when agents exploit all legal tax arbitrage opportunities. The analysis shows that integration does not accomplish the objectives that have been attributed to it. Instead of eliminating the double taxation of equity income, it simply removes the primary taxation of savings done through the corporation. The analysis has implications for the choice of a personal tax base and for the design of the corporate tax.
