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作者:DAVIES, JB; KUHN, P
作者单位:McMaster University; Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要:Recently, several authors have argued that social security can have positive effects on savings and welfare when individuals possess hidden information about their longevity, that is when there is adverse selection in annuity markets. This paper considers the related problem of the effects of social security when individuals can take hidden actions to affect their longevity, that is when there is moral hazard in annuity markets. In contrast to the adverse-selection models, we show that social ...
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作者:ROMER, T; ROSENTHAL, H; MUNLEY, VG
作者单位:Carnegie Mellon University; Lehigh University
摘要:Allocation of resources in the local public sector involves economic and political forces. In many U.S. states the bulk of spending on public education is subject to referendum. We link spending proposals to referendum outcomes. Our model makes use of voting data to shed light on the extent to which referenda constrain spending. We use data from school budget referenda in 544 New York school districts for the 1975-1976 school year. Our econometric results and simulations based on them reveal c...
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作者:AMIEL, Y; COWELL, FA
作者单位:University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要:We reconsider some of the basic assumptions of the literature on inequality analysis. Students' views on the meaning of inequality comparisons were elicited by means of a questionnaire involving both numerical and verbal questions. The responses suggest that two important axioms the principle of transfers and decomposability are not universally accepted.
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作者:BILODEAU, M
作者单位:Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要:If individuals are free to direct their gifts to any charity, why would they contribute instead to an institution like the United Way that may not disburse their donations as they would have themselves? It is shown that 'contributing only to the United Fund' can be a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, if the Fund plays after everyone else and is able to offset direct contributions. However, donations to a United Fund may be lower than direct contributions would have been, so that an optimal grants p...
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作者:THISSE, JF; WILDASIN, DE
作者单位:Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne
摘要:We consider a model in which the location of a single public facility is fixed somewhere in an urban area. There are two firms that choose locations; the locations of households, competing for space in the land market, are also endogenous. The analysis examines the nature of the spatial equilibrium and shows that different kinds of equilibria can emerge depending on the parameters of the model. The welfare implications of changes in transportation cost and the location of the public facility a...
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作者:WILSON, LS
作者单位:University of Alberta; University of Essex
摘要:Those familiar with Kenya since independence will know of the importance of the Harambee system. The term Harambee has come to mean the provision of goods, usually social infrastructure, through the voluntary cooperation of members of the community. Provision of public goods in this way is an important alternative to the more normal method, provision through tax finance. Here we compare these two methods of provision with a view towards determining, first, the circumstances under which Harambe...
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作者:ANDERSON, JE; YOUNG, L
作者单位:University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要:We characterize the time profile of the optimal consumption tax in a small open economy under foreseen fluctuations in the taste for current consumption, productivity, or external interest rates. We give conditions for the efficient tax to be lowered or raised when productivity rises. Taste fluctuations are parameterized to be equivalent to effective consumption price fluctuations. We give conditions under which the optimal tax rises or falls with the effective price. In contrast, the optimal ...
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作者:RONEN, J
摘要:This paper revisits the transfer pricing scheme proposed by J. Ronen in 1974 (Journal of Public Economics 3, 71-82) and the controversy it gave rise to (T. Groves and M. Loeb, Journal of Public Economics 5, 353 359). The latter suggested that through centralized decisions on commodity transfers, problems they point out in Ronen's decenralized scheme could be alleviated. I establish here that under the Ronen scheme, decentralized divisions within a firm or firms which exchange externalities wit...
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作者:HARRINGTON, JE
摘要:This paper shows that a party can credibly establish a platform more moderate than the ideology of its members and thereby raise the probability that the party's nominee wins the election. A lame duck incumbent optimally implements his party's platform in order to maintain his party's reputation for having a moderate platform. This increases the likelihood that his party retains power. When candidates credibly locate themselves in policy space via this mechanism, we show that if candidates are...