INFRASTRUCTURAL COMPETITION AMONG JURISDICTIONS
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
TAYLOR, L
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(92)90022-8
发表日期：
1992
页码：
241-259
关键词：
摘要：
This paper models jurisdictions that compete for an industry by building infrastructure more rapidly than their identical neighbors. Such competition can waste resources. Lucrative 'prizes' - the tax revenues and the value of jobs that an incoming firm would provide - stimulate infrastructural spending and waste. Low initial levels of infrastructure discourage infrastructural competition. The paper urges a cautious approach toward federal subsidies of local expenditures on infrastructure.
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