SOCIAL-CONTRACT, TAXATION AND THE STANDING OF DEADWEIGHT LOSS
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
MUSGRAVE, RA
署名单位：
Harvard University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(92)90074-P
发表日期：
1992
页码：
369-381
关键词：
摘要：
This paper develops the proposition that the normative design of a good tax system depends on the ethical premise or social contract on which society is taken to operate. This thesis is applied to Lockean entitlement to earnings with its corollary of benefit taxation and to the utilitarian model with its counterpart of maximum welfare or least total sacrifice. Fairness rules including maximin are also noted. For each case the role of tax avoidance and resulting deadweight loss is examined and found of questionable standing. In concluding, a parallel is drawn with the role of punishement in jurisprudence.
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