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作者：DILLEN, M
摘要：This paper shows how we can correct market failure due to imperfect competition by using taxes and subsidies. The analysis is carried out at the general equilibrium level and the importance of objective demand curves is stressed. The main conclusions are: first, it is possible to tax the economy back to the Walrasian equilibrium by using linear taxes and subsidies; second, the welfare theorem holds in an imperfectly competitive economy with corrective taxes and subsidies; third, a competitive ...
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作者：ZODROW, GR
摘要：Several observers have concluded that the equivalence between the cash flow and wage tax approaches to direct consumption taxation breaks down in the presence of uncertainty, as individuals with extraordinarily large gains are treated too generously under the latter approach. In particular, Ahsan (Journal of Public Economics, 1989, 40, 99-134; Canadian Journal of Economics, 1990, 23, 408-433) contends that equivalence obtains only if returns in excess of a safe rate of return are included in t...
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作者：NOISET, L; OAKLAND, W
作者单位：Tulane University; United States Department of the Treasury
摘要：This paper examines the properties of capital taxation within a metropolitan environment. It is demonstrated that when the boundaries of the central city jurisdiction fail to incorporate the entire metropolitan community, the central city can redistribute wealth from suburban land-owners to its residents. In effect, the central city can exploit its suburbs. It does so through capital tax or subsidy policies which reduce employment opportunities in the metropolis. Hence, central city fiscal pol...
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作者：BUCOVETSKY, S
摘要：Regional or local governments often appear to favour the interests of those who own land in the region. Here the implications of this sort of policy making are modelled formally. People are assumed perfectly mobile between regions, but are assumed to own land only in the region of their birth. The Nash equilibrium is shown to be efficient if and only if no migration (of capital or labour) is needed to achieve efficiency. Otherwise, tax competition leads to too little migration. Voluntary inter...
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作者：PASHARDES, P
摘要：In the context of a rank-3 demand system equivalence scales measuring the cost of demographic characteristics independently of the base utility level can be identified from cross-section data without demographic separability restrictions. Although this can also be achieved with a rank-2 demand system that contains a nonlinear log expenditure term in its budget shares, tests performed in a nested framework suggest that the rank-3 demand system approach is empirically superior. The informative s...
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作者：BOVENBERG, AL; SMULDERS, S
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Tilburg University
摘要：This paper explores the link between environmental quality and economic growth in an endogenous growth model that incorporates pollution-augmenting technological change. It examines the conditions under which sustainable growth is both feasible and optimal. We explore also how the government should intervene to ensure the optimal levels of natural and knowledge capital, which share a public-goods character. We establish the conditions for a more ambitious environmental policy to raise long-run...
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作者：BUCHHOLZ, W; KONRAD, KA
作者单位：Free University of Berlin; University of Bergen
摘要：This paper considers strategic monetary transfers between two agents when these contribute to a mutual public good. If the agents differ in their contribution productivity, then the less productive agent has an incentive to make large unconditional transfers to the more productive agent. Although agents move simultaneously in each stage of the game, the less productive agent becomes a Stackelberg leader. Furthermore, the generic subgame perfect equilibrium is characterized by full specializati...
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作者：BOSE, P
摘要：This paper shows that with a hierarchical structure of enforcement, regulatory errors cause the optimal penalty to be non-maximal even if offenders are risk neutral (and fines are pure transfers), and the private benefit from violation is strictly less than the social cost for all individuals. In contrast, with error-free monitoring, no finite fine is optimal within the same hierarchical structure. Also, full compliance is an equilibrium outcome in the presence of errors whereas, in the absenc...
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作者：HAUSMAN, JA; LEONARD, GK; MCFADDEN, D
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：A two-stage budgeting approach can often be taken when analyzing consumer choice situations. In this paper we examine the particular situation where a consumer makes purchases of a discrete commodity of which there are a number of brands. In the first stage, the consumer decides how many purchases to make; in the second stage, the consumer decides how to allocate these purchases across brands. Our econometric approach to this type of situation uses a utility-consistent, combined discrete choic...
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作者：HOFF, K; LYON, AB
摘要：Economists generally have argued that income redistribution comes at a cost in aggregate income. We provide a counter-example in a model where private information gives rise to incentive constraints. In the model, a wage tax creates the usual distortion in labor-leisure choices, but the redistributive grants that it finances reduce a distortion in investment in higher education. We prove that simple redistributive policies can yield Pareto improvements and increase aggregate income. Indeed, re...
