Why do firms hide? Bribes and unofficial activity after communism

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Johnson, S; Kaufmann, D; McMillan, J; Woodruff, C
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); The World Bank; Stanford University; University of California System; University of California San Diego
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00094-8
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 495-520
• 关键词: corruption; taxation; legal system; unofficial economy

摘要

Our survey of private manufacturing firms finds the size of hidden 'unofficial' activity to be much larger in Russia and Ukraine than in Poland, Slovakia and Romania. A comparison of cross-country averages shows that managers in Russia and Ukraine face higher effective tax rates, worse bureaucratic corruption, greater incidence of mafia protection, and have less faith in the court system. Our firm-level regressions for the three Eastern European countries find that bureaucratic corruption is significantly associated with hiding output. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.