Earmarked taxation:: welfare versus political support

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Bös, D
• 署名单位: University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00075-4
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 439-462
• 关键词: earmarking; efficient taxation; asymmetric information

摘要

Compared with the traditional public-finance approach of a monolithic fully informed planner, earmarking of taxation is less likely to be optimal if a principal-agent setting is considered. where taxing and spending by performed by two separate agents which are monitored by the parliament. We assume that the parliament either maximizes welfare or expected votes. Vote maximizers are more inclined to choose earmarking, but at the price of inefficiently high costs. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved. JEL classification: H21; D82.