Political ownership

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bennedsen, M
• 署名单位: Copenhagen Business School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00096-1
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 559-581
• 关键词: ownership structure; influence externality; side payments; resource allocation

摘要

Political involvement in the operation of an enterprise, whether it is private or state owned, creates opportunities fur interest groups to influence the allocation of resources. Resource allocation transfers rent both between unions and private owners within the firm and between these organized insiders and the disorganized taxpayers. I investigate how insiders' lobby activities distort resource allocation in a state owned enterprise. Then I show that efficiency in labour allocation is improved when cash flow is transferred to private owners, Finally, I analyze how transferring control rights affects efficiency in resource allocation when there are restrictions on side payments between the interest groups. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.