The value of genetic information in the life insurance market
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Hoy, M; Polborn, M
署名单位：
University of Guelph; University of Munich
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00118-8
发表日期：
2000
页码：
235-252
关键词：
摘要：
This paper analyzes the effects of additional information in a life insurance market under adverse selection. Individuals have an incentive to acquire information about their risk type if their informational status cannot be observed by insurers. In aggregate, however, the existence of a testing opportunity has an effect on the equilibrium premium. We describe the conditions under which, from an ex ante standpoint, all individuals gain, all lose or in which some gain and some lose from the existence of the test. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
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