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作者：Montero, JP
作者单位：Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This paper studies a phase-in emissions trading program with voluntary opt-in possibilities for non-affected firms and derives optimal permits allocations to affected and opt-in firms when the environmental regulator has incomplete information on individual unrestricted emissions and control costs. The regulator faces a trade-off between production efficiency (minimization of control costs) and information rent extraction (reduction of excess permits allocated to opt-in firms). The first-best ...
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作者：Royalty, AB
作者单位：Stanford University; Purdue University System; Purdue University; Purdue University in Indianapolis
摘要：In this paper, I estimate the effect of the tax preference for employer-provided health insurance on the probability that an employee will be eligible for health insurance at work. I instrument for marginal tax rates with state-level state income tax rates and I control for unobservable state effects that could be correlated with the state income tax instrument by comparing the estimated tax effect on employer-provided health insurance, to the tax effect on sick leave, a fringe benefit that do...
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作者：Leblanc, W; Snyder, JM; Tripathi, M
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); California Institute of Technology; Boston Consulting Group (BCG)
摘要：Despite evidence that modern democracies systematically shortchange public investment goods, relatively little theoretical work exists to explain this phenomenon. We build on Baron and Ferejohn's (American Political Science Review, 83(4) (1989) 1181-1206) bargaining model to describe public investments in a setting of budgetary politics. Specifically, we show that underinvestment inherently arises from distributive politics within a majoritarian institution. The inability of current majorities...
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作者：Swaroop, V; Jha, S; Rajkumar, AS
作者单位：The World Bank
摘要：This paper models fiscal effects of foreign aid in a federal system of governance. Our main innovation is to incorporate the inter-governmental fiscal link in examining economic fungibility of foreign aid. The model is applied to the expenditure decisions of the central government of India. The two main findings are: (i) Foreign aid merely substitutes for spending that the government would have undertaken anyway; funds freed by aid are spent on non-development activities, and (ii) In passing e...
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作者：Zhuravskaya, EV
摘要：Based on a unique data set on Russian city budgets, this paper shows that revenue sharing between regional and local,governments provides local governments with no incentive to increase tax base or provide public goods. Any change in local government's own revenues is almost entirely offset by changes in shared revenues. This leads to governmental over-regulation of private businesses. It is shown that fiscal incentives are a determinant of the formation of private business and the efficiency ...
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作者：Hall, J; Preston, I
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; University College London
摘要：Perceptions of private benefits from hypothecated tax increases may be mon or less correlated with income both because individuals with different incomes have different interests in expanding public services and because they anticipate bearing different shares of the implied tax burden. We report on analysis of cross-sectional data from the United Kingdom in which respondents have been randomly allocated to different but precisely specified tax instruments in a way which should allow separatio...
