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作者:Besley, T
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作者:Bennett, J; Maw, J
作者单位:Brunel University; Swansea University
摘要:A model is developed in which an industry of N greater than or equal to 1 firms is privatised. The 'participation' method of privatisation is used, whereby firms are sold for cash, but the state retains a proportionate share of ownership. In each firm the new private owner has the opportunity to make a reorganisational investment, before output is produced. This investment is unobservable by the state, and therefore non-contractible, There is Cournot competition in the product market. The welf...
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作者:Cahuc, P; Lehmann, E
作者单位:Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Institut Universitaire de France
摘要:In this paper, we investigate whether unemployment benefits should decrease with the unemployment spell in a model where both job search intensity and wages are endogenous. Wages are set by collective agreements bargained by insiders. It is shown that a more declining time sequence of unemployment benefits leads to wage increases when the tax rate is given. Such an effect may imply an increase in unemployment and counteracts the response of job search intensity that can be found in standard jo...
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作者:Wu, YR; Zhang, JX
作者单位:Rutgers University System; Rutgers University Newark; Rutgers University New Brunswick; University of Hong Kong
摘要:Existing studies on the effects of fiscal policy under imperfect competition typically treat each firm's price-cost markup as fixed. This paper examines the implications of endogenising the markup in a simple model of income taxation under monopolistic competition. It is demonstrated that an increase in income tax reduces the number of firms, lessens competition among surviving firms and raises the optimal markups in the new steady state. Through this channel, the effects of income taxation on...
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作者:Dixit, A; Olson, M
作者单位:Princeton University
摘要:The Cease Theorem states that costless enforcement of voluntary agreements yields efficient outcomes. We argue that previous treatments fail to recognize the full meaning of 'voluntary'. It requires a two-stage game: a non-cooperative participation decision, followed by Coaseian bargaining only among those who choose to participate. We illustrate this in a simple public-goods model, and find outcomes ranging from extremely inefficient to fully efficient. However, the efficient equilibrium is n...
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作者:Rajan, RG; Zingales, L
作者单位:University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要:When parties are very unequally endowed, agreement may be very difficult to reach, even if the specific transaction is easy to contract on, and fungible resources can be transferred to compensate the losing party. The very fungibility of the resource transferred makes it hard to restrict its use, changing the amount the parties involved spend in trying to grab future rents. This spill-over effect can inhibit otherwise valuable transactions, as well as enable otherwise inefficient transactions....
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作者:[Anonymous]
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作者:Brett, C; Keen, M
作者单位:University of Essex; International Monetary Fund
摘要:Far from being used to secure a 'double dividend' by reducing distorting taxes, revenues from environmental taxes seem quite often to be earmarked to particular spending programs. In the US, for example, a range of such taxes feed into environmental trust funds. Such earmarking runs counter to standard notions of good practice in taxing and spending. This paper develops and explores an explanation of such apparent inefficiencies in terms of political uncertainty: roughly, a green incumbent may...
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作者:Alesina, A; Rosenthal, H
作者单位:Princeton University; Harvard University
摘要:In standard spatial models of elections, parties with policy preferences take divergent positions. Their platform positions are less separated than are the parties' ideal policies. if policy is the result of an executive-legislative compromise, the policy preferences of the parties can be moderated by voter behavior. Divided government may result. Since parties anticipate the moderated outcomes, they have an added incentive to choose separated platforms. Consequently, divergence in platforms i...
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作者:Hoy, M; Polborn, M
作者单位:University of Guelph; University of Munich
摘要:This paper analyzes the effects of additional information in a life insurance market under adverse selection. Individuals have an incentive to acquire information about their risk type if their informational status cannot be observed by insurers. In aggregate, however, the existence of a testing opportunity has an effect on the equilibrium premium. We describe the conditions under which, from an ex ante standpoint, all individuals gain, all lose or in which some gain and some lose from the exi...