Optimal design of a phase-in emissions trading program

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Montero, JP
• 署名单位: Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00050-X
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 273-291
• 关键词: emissions trading; voluntary opt-in; adverse selection

摘要

This paper studies a phase-in emissions trading program with voluntary opt-in possibilities for non-affected firms and derives optimal permits allocations to affected and opt-in firms when the environmental regulator has incomplete information on individual unrestricted emissions and control costs. The regulator faces a trade-off between production efficiency (minimization of control costs) and information rent extraction (reduction of excess permits allocated to opt-in firms). The first-best equilibrium can be attained if the regulator can freely allocate permits to affected and opt-in firms; otherwise a second-best equilibrium is implemented. The latter is sensitive to uncertainty in control costs and benefits. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.