Terrorist backlash, terrorism mitigation, and policy delegation

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Siqueira, Kevin; Sandler, Todd
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.02.005
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 1800-1815
• 关键词: Terrorism; delegation problem; counterterrorism; public goods; three-stage game

摘要

This paper presents a three-stage proactive game involving terrorists, elected policymakers, and voters. In each of two targeted countries, a representative voter chooses an elected policymaker, charged with deciding proactive countermeasures to ameliorate a transnational terrorist threat. Two primary considerations drive the voters' strategic choice: free riding on the other countries' countermeasures and limiting a reprisal terrorist attack. The resulting low proactive countermeasures benefit the terrorists, whose attacks successfully exploit voters' strategic actions. This finding stems from a delegation problem where leadership by voters has a detrimental consequence on the well-being of targeted countries. Domestic politics add another layer of concern when addressing a common terrorist threat. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.