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作者：Krautheim, Sebastian; Schmidt-Eisenlohr, Tim
作者单位：University of Oxford; Goethe University Frankfurt
摘要：Larger firms are more likely to use tax haven operations to exploit international tax differences. We study tax competition between a large country and a tax haven. In the large country, heterogeneous firms operate under monopolistic competition and can choose to shift profits abroad. We show that a higher degree of firm heterogeneity (a mean-preserving spread of the cost distribution) increases the degree of tax competition, i.e. it decreases the equilibrium tax rate of the large country, lea...
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作者：Carrell, Scott E.; Hoekstra, Mark; West, James E.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis; National Bureau of Economic Research; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; United States Department of Defense; United States Air Force; United States Air Force Academy
摘要：This paper examines the effect of alcohol consumption on student achievement. To do so, we exploit the discontinuity in drinking at age 21 at a college in which the minimum legal drinking age is strictly enforced. We find that drinking causes significant reductions in academic performance, particularly for the highest-performing students. This suggests that the negative consequences of alcohol consumption extend beyond the narrow segment of the population at risk of more severe, low-frequency,...
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作者：Epstein, Gil S.; Mealem, Yosef; Nitzan, Shmuel
作者单位：Bar Ilan University; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Netanya Academic College
摘要：Many economic and political decisions are the outcome of strategic contests for a given prize. The nature of such contests can be determined by a designer who is driven by political considerations with a specific political culture. The main objective of this study is to analyze the effect of political culture and of valuation asymmetry on discrimination between the contestants. The weights assigned to the public well being and the contestants' efforts represent the political culture while disc...
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作者：Cervellati, Matteo; Esteban, Joan; Kranich, Laurence
作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); University of Bologna; IZA Institute Labor Economics; State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Albany, SUNY
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作者：D' Amato, Marcello; Galasso, Vincenzo
作者单位：Bocconi University; University of Salerno
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作者：Mengel, Friederike; Peeters, Ronald
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：We conduct a repeated VCM (voluntary contribution mechanism) experiment using the strategy method and compare contribution behavior in a partner and a stranger matching in both a cold and a hot setting, where the latter differs from the former by allowing participants to revise their strategies in each round. Irrespective of whether the setting is hot or cold we find that partners provide higher initial contributions than strangers. In the cold setting (without revision possibility) partners c...
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作者：Ghatak, Maitreesh; Mueller, Hannes
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE)
摘要：We re-examine the labor donation theory of not-for-profits and show that these organizations may exist not necessarily because motivated workers prefer to work in them, or that they dominate for-profits in terms of welfare, but because the excess supply of motivated workers makes the non-profit form more attractive to managers. We show that if firms had to compete for motivated workers then not-for-profit firms would be competed out by for-profit firms. Therefore, in the choice between not-for...
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作者：Dhillon, Amrita; Rigolini, Jamele
作者单位：University of Warwick
摘要：We examine how formal and informal contract enforcing institutions interact in a competitive market with asymmetric information where consumers do not observe quality before purchase. Firm level incentives for producing high quality can be achieved with an informal enforcement mechanism, reputation, the efficacy of which is enhanced by consumers investing in connectedness: or with a formal mechanism, legal enforcement, the effectiveness of which can be reduced by means of bribes. We show that ...
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作者：Llavador, Humberto; Solano-Garcia, Angel
作者单位：University of Granada; University of Granada; Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：This paper analyzes the political economy of immigration when the salient electoral issue is the level of immigrants and the relevant immigration policy is the expenditure in immigration control. We consider that immigration affects voters' welfare through economic and non-economic factors. We model political competition a la Wittman with the ideology of parties endogenously determined at equilibrium. At equilibrium, parties propose different levels of immigration, located to the left and to t...
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作者：Becker, Johannes; Fuest, Clemens
作者单位：University of Oxford; Max Planck Society
摘要：This paper analyses tax competition and tax coordination in a model where capital flows occur in the form of mergers and acquisitions, rather than greenfield investment. In this framework, we show that differences in residence based taxes do not necessarily distort international ownership patterns. Moreover, tax competition yields globally efficient levels of source based corporate income taxes if residence based taxes on capital income are absent. In contrast, in the presence of residence bas...
