Thanks for nothing? Not-for-profits and motivated agents

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ghatak, Maitreesh; Mueller, Hannes
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.09.003
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 94-105
• 关键词: Not-for-profits; Intrinsic motivation; Labor donation; free-riding

摘要

We re-examine the labor donation theory of not-for-profits and show that these organizations may exist not necessarily because motivated workers prefer to work in them, or that they dominate for-profits in terms of welfare, but because the excess supply of motivated workers makes the non-profit form more attractive to managers. We show that if firms had to compete for motivated workers then not-for-profit firms would be competed out by for-profit firms. Therefore, in the choice between not-for-profit and for-profit provision, other than incentive problems, the distribution of rents between management and workers, and consequently, the relative scarcity of motivated workers may play an important role. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.