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作者：Podhorsky, Andrea
作者单位：York University - Canada
摘要：This paper studies how the voluntary standards established by certification programs affect consumer welfare and international trade in an open world economy. I develop a two-country model with differentiated products and imperfectly-informed consumers. Consumers in both countries value the quality of goods, but cannot discern their quality unless they are certified. Firms in each country differ in their abilities to produce quality, and the distribution of technological ability is superior in...
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作者：Staubli, Stefan; Zweimueller, Josef
作者单位：RAND Corporation; University of Zurich; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：Two pension reforms in Austria increased the early retirement age (ERA) from 60 to 62 for men and from 55 to 58.25 for women. We find that raising the ERA increased employment by 9.75 percentage points among affected men and by 11 percentage points among affected women. The reforms had large spillover effects on the unemployment insurance program but negligible effects on disability insurance claims. Specifically, unemployment increased by 12.5 percentage points among men and by 11.8 percentag...
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作者：Hsu, Minchung; Yang, C. C.
作者单位：National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies; Academia Sinica - Taiwan; National Chengchi University; Feng Chia University
摘要：This paper quantitatively characterizes optimal linear and two-bracket income taxes. We consider a dynamic-stochastic-general-equilibrium model in which tax design involves redistributing income for both equity and social insurance. Substantive findings include: (i) a significant fraction of agents supply zero labor or hold zero assets at the optimum; (ii) neglecting tax distortion imposed on either of labor-leisure and consumption-saving decisions will lead to the prescription of tax codes th...
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作者：Niehaus, Paul; Sukhtankar, Sandip
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; Dartmouth College
摘要：Optimal fiscal policy depends on the marginal benefits of public spending. In developing countries corrupt officials often embezzle funds, so optimal policy should reflect marginal corruption. We analyze marginal corruption in the context of a statutory wage increase in India's employment guarantee scheme. Strikingly, workers received none of the increase even though initially they were on average overpaid. The data are inconsistent with theories of voice in which the threat of complaints limi...
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作者：Cervellati, Matteo; Vanin, Paolo
作者单位：University of Bologna; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：This paper proposes a theory of the relationship between prohibitions and temptation. In the presence of self-control problems, moral values may increase individual material welfare (and utility) by serving as a self-commitment device. The model investigates the relationship between morality and temptation, the individual gains from morality, the interaction between external sanctions and moral self-punishment and the spread and strength of individually optimal moral values. The empirical anal...
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作者：Kempf, Hubert; Rossignol, Stephane
作者单位：Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); Paris School of Economics; Universite Paris-VIII
摘要：In this paper we set up a political economy model of a two-country world economy, where an international agreement on the provisions of public goods generating cross-border externalities, such as environment protection, subject to feasibility, efficiency and equity constraints, has to be negotiated by two elected national delegates. We prove that any international agreement involves higher public good provisions (through higher contributions in both countries) than in the case of no-agreement....
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作者：Elschner, Christina
作者单位：European University Viadrina Frankfurt Oder
摘要：Tax systems often discriminate among the various organizational forms of doing business and may therefore affect the choice of organizational form. This paper studies how special tax regimes shape the organizational form choice. Although the full effects depend on the way that firm-level special tax regimes are designed, special regimes generally tend to favor pass-through firms over non-pass-through firms. The tonnage tax, a tax incentive for international shipping firms available in many cou...
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作者：Saez, Emmanuel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper analyzes optimal progressive capital income taxation in an infinite horizon model where individuals differ only through their initial wealth. We consider progressive capital income tax schedules taking a simple two-bracket form with an exemption bracket at the bottom and a single marginal tax rate above a time varying exemption threshold. Individuals are taxed until their wealth is reduced down to the exemption threshold. The fraction of individuals subject to capital income taxatio...
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作者：Nyce, Steven; Schieber, Sylvester J.; Shoven, John B.; Slavov, Sita Nataraj; Wise, David A.
作者单位：Stanford University; American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：The strong link between health insurance and employment in the United States may cause workers to delay retirement until they become eligible for Medicare at age 65. However, some employers extend health insurance benefits to their retirees, and individuals who are eligible for such retiree health benefits need not wait until age 65 to retire with group health coverage. We investigate the impact of retiree health insurance on early retirement using employee-level data from 54 diverse firms tha...
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作者：Colombo, Luca; Labrecciosa, Paola
作者单位：Deakin University; Monash University
摘要：This paper studies the impact of commodity taxes on the sustainability of collusion in imperfectly competitive markets. We consider both a Cournot and a Bertrand supergame with discounting, with collusion being supported by either grim trigger strategies or stick-and-carrot optimal punishments. We show that, irrespective of firms' choice variable, and under both punishment schemes, increased reliance on ad valorem taxation makes it easier for firms to sustain a collusive agreement. Contrary to...
