The marginal rate of corruption in public programs: Evidence from India

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Niehaus, Paul; Sukhtankar, Sandip
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego; Dartmouth College
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.05.001
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 52-64
• 关键词: corruption; leakage; VOICE; EXIT; Public programs

摘要

Optimal fiscal policy depends on the marginal benefits of public spending. In developing countries corrupt officials often embezzle funds, so optimal policy should reflect marginal corruption. We analyze marginal corruption in the context of a statutory wage increase in India's employment guarantee scheme. Strikingly, workers received none of the increase even though initially they were on average overpaid. The data are inconsistent with theories of voice in which the threat of complaints limits corruption, but consistent with theories of exit in which outside options in the private sector limit how much rent officials can extract. (c) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.