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作者：Gravel, Nicolas; Oddou, Remy
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite; Universite Paris Saclay
摘要：This paper examines the segregative properties of endogenous processes of jurisdiction formation in the presence of a competitive land market. In the considered model, a continuum of households with different income levels and the same preference for local public goods, private spending and housing choose a location from a finite set. Each location has an initial endowment of housing that is priced competitively and that belongs to absentee landlords. Each location is also endowed with a speci...
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作者：Cordis, Adriana S.; Warren, Patrick L.
作者单位：Winthrop University; Clemson University
摘要：We assess the effect of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) laws on public corruption in the United States. Specifically, we investigate the impact of switching from a weak to a strong state-level FOIA law on corruption convictions of state and local government officials. The evidence suggests that strengthening FOIA laws has two offsetting effects: reducing corruption and increasing the probability that corrupt acts are detected. The conflation of these two effects led prior work to find little...
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作者：Kelly, Elaine; Rasul, Imran
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; University College London
摘要：We evaluate the impact of a policing experiment that depenalized the possession of small quantities of cannabis in the London borough of Lambeth, on hospital admissions related to illicit drug use. To do so, we exploit administrative records on individual hospital admissions classified by ICD-10 diagnosis codes. These records allow the construction of a quarterly panel data set for London boroughs running from 1997 to 2009 to estimate the short and long run impacts of the depenalization policy...
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作者：Vogl, Tom S.
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：Elections between black and white candidates tend to involve close margins and high turnout. Using a novel dataset of municipal vote returns during the rise of black mayors in U.S. cities, this paper establishes new facts about turnout and competition in close interracial elections. In the South, but not the North, close black victories were more likely than close black losses, involved higher turnout than close black losses, and were more likely than close black losses to be followed by subse...
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作者：Koessler, Frederic; Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We consider the problem faced by firms operating in a foreign country characterized by weak governance. Our focus is on extortion based on the threat of expropriation and bureaucratic harassment. The bureaucrat's bargaining power is characterized by a general extortion mechanism adapted from the optimal auction theory in Myerson (1981). This characterization is used to analyze the determinants of the quality of governance and whether and how this is improved by political-risk insurance. This i...
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作者：Weber, Caroline E.
作者单位：University of Oregon
摘要：The elasticity of taxable income (ETI) is a central parameter for tax policy debates. This paper shows that mean reversion prevents most estimators employed in the literature from obtaining consistent estimates of the Ell. A new method is proposed that will resolve inconsistency due to mean reversion under testable assumptions regarding the degree of serial correlation in the error term. Using this procedure. I estimate an ETI of 0.858, which is about twice as large as the estimates found in t...
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作者：Edwards, James T.; List, John A.
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：People respond to those who ask. Within the charitable fundraising community, the power of the ask represents the backbone of most fundraising strategies. Despite this, the optimal design of communication strategies has received less formal attention. For their part, economists have recently explored how communication affects empathy, altruism, and giving rates to charities. Our study takes a step back from this literature to examine how suggestions-a direct ask for a certain amount of money-a...
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作者：Imas, Alex
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：We study whether using prosocial incentives, where effort is tied directly to charitable contributions, may lead to better performance than standard incentive schemes. In a real-effort task, individuals indeed work harder for charity than for themselves, but only when incentive stakes are low. When stakes are raised, effort increases when individuals work for themselves but not when they work for others and, as a result, the difference in provided effort disappears. Individuals correctly antic...
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作者：Abbink, Klaus; Dasgupta, Utteeyo; Gangadharan, Lata; Jain, Tarun
作者单位：Monash University; Franklin & Marshall College; Indian School of Business (ISB)
摘要：This paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat harassment bribes. Asymmetric liability is a mechanism where bribe-takers are culpable but bribe-givers have legal immunity. Results from our experiment indicate that while this policy has the potential to significantly reduce corrupt practices, weak economic incentives for the bribe-giver, or retaliation by bribe-takers can mitigate the disciplining effect of such an implementation. Asymmetric liability on its own m...
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作者：Bucovetsky, S.
作者单位：York University - Canada
摘要：A simple, partial equilibrium model of the supply of offshore tax havens is analyzed, when multinationals are capable of sheltering some of their worldwide income. This model provides a few contrasting predictions to those in Tax Competition with Parasitic Tax Havens by Slemrod and Wilson. Slemrod and Wilson model tax sheltering as a production process which uses up scarce resources in the tax haven providing it. Here, multinational firms can transfer some of their income costlessly to an offs...
