Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Abbink, Klaus; Dasgupta, Utteeyo; Gangadharan, Lata; Jain, Tarun
• 署名单位: Monash University; Franklin & Marshall College; Indian School of Business (ISB)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.12.012
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 17-28
• 关键词: Harassment bribes; experiment; Asymmetric penalty; Retaliation

摘要

This paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat harassment bribes. Asymmetric liability is a mechanism where bribe-takers are culpable but bribe-givers have legal immunity. Results from our experiment indicate that while this policy has the potential to significantly reduce corrupt practices, weak economic incentives for the bribe-giver, or retaliation by bribe-takers can mitigate the disciplining effect of such an implementation. Asymmetric liability on its own may hence face challenges in the field. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.