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作者:Decerf, Benoit
作者单位:University of Namur
摘要:No current strategy to measure income poverty is able to (i) account for both its absolute and relative aspects and (ii) always consider that an individual who is absolutely poor is poorer than another individual who is only relatively poor. I propose a measure of income poverty satisfying (i) and (ii). Unlike alternative proposals satisfying (i), a decrease in a poor individual's income never reduces this measure. An application illustrates that the measure yields intuitive judgments about un...
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作者:Karakas, Leyla D.
作者单位:Syracuse University
摘要:This paper studies limits on executive authority by identifying a dynamic channel through which they interact with policy-making. The model features two agents, one of which becomes the incumbent in each of the two periods and unilaterally decides on investment in a common-interest public good, targeted pork spending and the future executive constraint. While a weak constraint permits an incumbent to enact his desired policies in case of re-election, the same applies to his opponent in the opp...
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作者:Boehringer, Christoph; Rosendahl, Knut Einar; Storrosten, Halvor Briseid
作者单位:Carl von Ossietzky Universitat Oldenburg; Norwegian University of Life Sciences; Statistics Norway
摘要:Unilateral climate policy induces carbon leakage through the relocation of emission-intensive and trade-exposed industries to regions without emission regulation. Previous studies suggest that emission pricing combined with border carbon adjustment is a second-best instrument, and more cost-effective than output-based rebating. We show that the combination of output-based rebating and a consumption tax for emission-intensive and trade-exposed goods can be equivalent with border carbon adjustme...
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作者:Barrera-Osorio, Felipe; Raju, Dhushyanth
作者单位:Harvard University
摘要:We present evidence from the first three years of a randomized controlled trial of a government-administered pilot teacher performance pay program in Punjab, Pakistan. The program offers yearly cash bonuses to teachers in a sample of 600 public primary schools with the lowest mean student exam scores in the province. The bonus is linked to the change in the school's average student exam scores, the change in the school's enrollment, and the level of student exam participation in the school. Bo...
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作者:Epple, Dennis; Romano, Richard; Sarpca, Sinan; Sieg, Holger
作者单位:Carnegie Mellon University; National Bureau of Economic Research; State University System of Florida; University of Florida; Koc University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要:We develop a general equilibrium model of the market for undergraduate higher education that captures the coexistence of public and private colleges, the large degree of quality differentiation among them, and the tuition and admission policies that emerge from their competition for students. A quantitative version of the model matches well estimates of enrollment elasticities, variation in need-based and merit-based institutional aid with, respectively, student income and ability, and aggrega...
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作者:Chong, Alberto; Restrepo, Pascual
作者单位:University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; Universidad del Pacifico Peru; Boston University
摘要:We provide evidence supporting the Peltzman effect, by which individuals required to wear protective gear end up taking additional risks that potentially offset the intended aim of the device. We take advantage of the fact that wearing a visor a protective device in Ice Hockey is mandatory in European, minor, and junior leagues but not in the NHL. This allows us to estimate the impact of wearing a visor by comparing the behavior in the NHL and other leagues of players who always wear a visor w...
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作者:Doerrenberg, Philipp; Peichl, Andreas; Siegloch, Sebastian
作者单位:Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW); University of Mannheim; IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of Cologne; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要:Several recent studies show that the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) is not a sufficient statistic for the welfare costs of taxation due to factors such as tax-base shifting. This paper provides an additional argument demonstrating the non -sufficiency of the Ell namely tax deductions. Building on a theoretical framework which incorporates deductions in a standard optimal-tax model, we show that the ETI is not sufficient for welfare analysis if (i) deductions generate externalities and if (...
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作者:Cohen, Alex; Keiser, David A.
作者单位:Yale University; Iowa State University; Iowa State University
摘要:This paper examines the effectiveness of command-and-control policies in the presence of incomplete and overlapping regulations. We study how recent bans on phosphate in household dishwasher detergent affect pollution loads to waterways, costs at wastewater treatment facilities, and consumer behavior. We show that the effectiveness of the bans in reducing effluent depends critically on regulations at receiving treatment facilities. As cost minimizers, facilities with an emissions standard on p...
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作者:Palsson, Craig
作者单位:United States Department of Defense; United States Navy; Naval Postgraduate School
摘要:From 2005 to 2012, injuries to children under five increased by 10%, possibly because smartphones distract caregivers from supervising children. I exploit the expansion of AT&T's 3G network in both a difference-in-differences and a triple difference framework and find that hospitals experienced a 5% increase in emergency department visits for children ages 0-5, but none for children ages 6-10, after getting 3G. Age-specific injury patterns on playgrounds, from poisoning, and in sports further ...
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作者:Jakob, Michael; Kuebler, Dorothea; Steckel, Jan Christoph; van Veldhuizen, Roel
作者单位:Technical University of Berlin; Potsdam Institut fur Klimafolgenforschung
摘要:Although market-based environmental policy instruments feature prominently in economic theory and are widely employed, they often face public resistance. We argue that such resistance may be driven by moral responsibility, where citizens prefer to tackle the environmental problems that they have caused by themselves, rather than delegating the task to others by means of a market mechanism. Using a laboratory experiment that isolates moral responsibility from alternative explanations, we show t...