Regulatory protective measures and risky behavior: Evidence from ice hockey

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chong, Alberto; Restrepo, Pascual
• 署名单位: University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; Universidad del Pacifico Peru; Boston University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.04.002
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 1-11
• 关键词: Peltzman effect; Protective measures; Risky behavior

摘要

We provide evidence supporting the Peltzman effect, by which individuals required to wear protective gear end up taking additional risks that potentially offset the intended aim of the device. We take advantage of the fact that wearing a visor a protective device in Ice Hockey is mandatory in European, minor, and junior leagues but not in the NHL. This allows us to estimate the impact of wearing a visor by comparing the behavior in the NHL and other leagues of players who always wear a visor with that of players who wear one only when it is required. We find that when players are forced to wear a visor their behavior becomes more risky, earning an additional 0.19 penalty in minutes per game (compared to the average 1.14 penalty in minutes in our sample). We estimate an even larger effect of visors when we focus on players who were forced to use one during the 2004 season, when the NHL canceled its regular season and players had to move to European leagues temporarily. These estimates are not driven by players' observable attributes, playing style, or other differences across leagues. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.