-
作者：Chen, Shawn Xiaoguang
作者单位：University of Western Australia
摘要：This paper investigates the impact of the abolition of the agricultural taxes in 2005 across China on county governments' incentives for tax enforcement. I show that the revenue loss of county governments was largely offset by tougher tax enforcement. The incentive for VAT enforcement can be weakened, however, if the county: (1) receives a lower share of total VAT revenues; (2) has a broader VAT tax base; or, (3) has more abundant sources of revenue from land sales. These findings suggest that...
-
作者：Aragones, Enriqueta; Xefteris, Dimitrios
作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Autonomous University of Barcelona; University of Cyprus
摘要：Different voters might have different valuations of candidates' qualitative features. We argue that this intuitive fact acts as a strong stabilizing force in electoral competition dynamics when candidates are office motivated (pure strategy equilibria may exist, unlike when all voters favor the same candidate). Perhaps more importantly, it affects candidates' platform moderation incentives in a rather intriguing manner. When voters are evenly split, in terms of their candidates' quality valuat...
-
作者：Wen, Hefei; Hockenberry, Jason M.; Cummings, Janet R.
作者单位：University of Kentucky; Emory University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Substance use figures prominently in criminal behavior. As such expanding public insurance and improving access to substance use disorder (SUD) treatment can potentially reduce substance use and reduce crime. We examine the crime-reduction effect of Medicaid expansions through the Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability (HIFA) waivers. We find that HIFA-waiver expansion led to a sizeable reduction in the rates of robbery, aggravated assault and larceny theft. We also show that much of ...
-
作者：Gartner, Manja; Mollerstrom, Johanna; Seim, David
作者单位：Linkoping University; Humboldt University of Berlin; Leibniz Association; DIW Berlin - Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Stockholm University
摘要：Redistributive policies can provide an insurance against future negative economic shocks. This, in turn, implies that an individual's demand for redistribution is expected to increase with her risk aversion. To test this prediction, we elicit risk aversion and demand for redistribution through a well-established set of measures in a representative sample of the Swedish population. We document a statistically significant and robust positive relation between risk aversion and the demand for redi...
-
作者：Gresik, Thomas A.; Schindler, Dirk; Schjelderup, Guttorm
作者单位：University of Notre Dame; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要：Many subsidiaries can deduct interest payments on internal debt from their taxable income. By issuing internal debt from a tax haven, multinationals can shift income out of host countries through the interest rates they charge and the amount of internal debt they issue. We show that, from a welfare perspective, thin capitalization rules that restrict the amount of debt for which interest is tax deductible (safe harbor rules) are inferior to rules that limit the ratio of debt interest to pre-ta...
-
作者：Robinson, James A.; Torvik, Ragnar; Verdier, Thierry
作者单位：University of Chicago; Norwegian University of Science & Technology (NTNU); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech
摘要：In recent years many countries have witnessed a great deal of volatility in public budgets, be it due to volatility in the access to foreign loans in Greece, or to unstable oil prices in Venezuela. We study the political consequences of such public income volatility. As is standard, in out model political incentives create inefficient policies to increase re-election probabilities, but we show that making public income uncertain creates specific new effects. Future volatility reduces the benef...
-
作者：Bartling, Bjoern; Grieder, Manuel; Zehnder, Christian
作者单位：University of Zurich; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; University of Lausanne
摘要：Counterproductive reactions to unfavorable trading prices can cause inefficiencies in economic exchange. This paper studies whether the use of a competitive pricing mechanism reduces such wasteful activities. We report data from a laboratory experiment where a powerful buyer can trade with one of two sellers an environment that can lead to very low prices for the sellers. We find that low procurement prices trigger significantly less punishment by sellers if the buyer uses a competitive auctio...
-
作者：Jerch, Rhiannon; Kahn, Matthew E.; Li, Shanjun
作者单位：Cornell University; University of Southern California
摘要：Local governments spend roughly $1.6 trillion per year to provide a variety of public services ranging from police and fire protection to public schools and public transit However, we know little about public sector's productivity in delivering key services. Public bus service represents a standardized output for benchmarking the cost of local government service provision. Among the top twenty largest cities, there exists significant dispersion in the operating cost per bus mile with the highe...
-
作者：Fitzpatrick, Maria D.
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; Cornell University
摘要：In many states, local school districts are responsible for setting the earnings that determines the size of pensions, but are not required to make contributions to cover the resulting state pension fund liabilities. In this paper, I document evidence that this intergovernmental incentive inherent in public sector defined benefit pension systems distorts the amount and timing of income for public school teachers. I use the introduction of a policy that required experience-rating on earnings inc...
-
作者：Eichner, Thomas; Pethig, Rudiger
作者单位：Fern University Hagen; Universitat Siegen
摘要：In the world economy with interdependent markets for fossil fuel deposits and extracted fossil fuel, some coalition of countries may fight climate change by purchasing and preserving fossil fuel deposits, which would be exploited otherwise. Assuming that deposits are traded on a market with a uniform price, we find that the outcome is efficient if the coalition is a price taker in both markets, but inefficient if it acts strategically in the deposit market but not in the fuel market, or acts s...
