-
作者：Gaechter, Simon; Mengel, Friederike; Tsakas, Elias; Vostroknutov, Alexander
作者单位：University of Nottingham; University of Essex; Maastricht University; University of Trento; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：In a novel experimental design, we study public good games with dynamic interdependencies, where each agent's wealth at the end of period t serves as her endowment in t+1. In this setting, growth and inequality arise endogenously allowing us to address new questions regarding their interplay and effect on cooperation. We find that amounts contributed are increasing over time even in the absence of punishment possibilities. Variation in wealth is substantial with the richest groups earning more...
-
作者：Kittel, Bernhard; Kanitsar, Georg; Traub, Stefan
作者单位：University of Vienna; University of Vienna; Helmut Schmidt University; Helmut Schmidt University
摘要：The paper reports the results of a laboratory experiment assessing the impact of social position (endowment) and power (structurally advantaged or disadvantaged network positions) on redistributive decisions, which involve a classical efficiency-equality trade-off. The experiment involves three decision conditions: veil of ignorance, informed dictator, and majority vote. We use a three-person social-preference model in order to derive hypotheses on the effect of knowledge and power on tax choi...
-
作者：Abrell, Jan; Rausch, Sebastian
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This paper analyzes hybrid emissions trading systems (ETSs)under partitioned environmental regulation when firms' abatement costs and future emissions are uncertain. We show that hybrid policies that introduce bounds on the price or the quantity of abatement provide a way to hedge against differences in marginal abatement costs across partitions. Price bounds are more efficient than abatement bounds as they also use information on firms' abatement technologies while abatement bounds can only a...
-
作者：Baron, David P.; Bowen, T. Renee; Nunnari, Salvatore
作者单位：Stanford University; University of California System; University of California San Diego; National Bureau of Economic Research; Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：We present a laboratory experiment to study the effect of communication on durable coalitions coalitions that support the same allocation from one period to the next We study a bargaining setting where the status quo policy is determined by the policy implemented in the previous period. Our main experimental treatment is the opportunity for subjects to negotiate with one another through unrestricted cheap-talk communication before a proposal is made and comes to a vote. We compare committees w...
-
作者：Kaplow, Louis
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This article translates and extends Becker (1968) from public law enforcement to private litigation by examining optimal legal system design in a model with private suits, signals of case strength, court error, and two types of primary behavior: harmful acts that may be deterred and benign acts that may be chilled. The instruments examined are filing fees or subsidies that may be imposed on either party, damage awards and payments by Unsuccessful plaintiffs (each of which may be decoupled), an...
-
作者：Foremny, Dirk; Jofre-Monseny, Jordi; Sole-Olle, Albert
作者单位：University of Barcelona; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：This paper analyzes how local governments misreport population figures to obtain higher per capita grant allocations. In 1998, the allocation of a formula based grant in Spain switched from using the centrally administered census to local population registers administered by municipalities. The value of this per capita grant changes at fixed population thresholds for the entire local population. We exploit these notches to analyze the size distribution of municipalities to detect deliberate ma...
-
作者：Georgiadis, George
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We consider a dynamic game of private provision of a discrete public good. In our model, a group of agents contributes to a project over time, which is completed once the cumulative contributions reach a threshold. Provided that this occurs prior to a prespecified deadline, each agent receives a lump-sum payoff. We show that a shorter deadline can induce the agents to raise their efforts, but no matter the length of the deadline, effort provision is inefficient due to the agents' frontloading ...
-
作者：Wichman, Casey J.
作者单位：Resources for the Future
摘要：In this study, I estimate a causal effect of increased billing frequency on consumer behavior. I exploit a natural experiment in which residential water customers switched exogenously from bimonthly to monthly billing. Customers increase consumption by 3.5-5% in response to more frequent information. This result is reconciled in models of price and quantity uncertainty, where increases in billing frequency reduce the distortion in consumer perceptions. Using treatment effects as sufficient sta...
-
作者：Cremer, Helmuth; Gahvari, Firouz; Pestieau, Pierre
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Liege
摘要：When family assistance is uncertain, benefits cannot be conditioned on family aid. We study the role of private and public LTC insurance in this environment and compare the properties and optimality of the topping up versus opting out public insurance schemes. Under topping up, the required LTC is less than full insurance and should be provided publicly unless private insurance market for dependency is fair. With an opting out scheme, there will be three possible equilibria depending on the ch...
-
作者：Slemrod, Joel; Collins, Brett; Hoopes, Jeffrey L.; Reck, Daniel; Sebastiani, Michael
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We investigate the response of small businesses operating as sole proprietorships to Form 1099-K, an information report introduced in 2011 which provides the Internal Revenue Service with information about electronic sales (e.g., credit card sales). The overall impact of the policy appears to be relatively small. However, theory and distributional analysis isolates a subset of taxpayers expected to be especially sensitive to reporting, who report receipts equal to or slightly exceeding the rec...
