Competitive pricing reduces wasteful counterproductive behaviors

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bartling, Bjoern; Grieder, Manuel; Zehnder, Christian
• 署名单位: University of Zurich; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; University of Lausanne
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.08.007
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 34-47
• 关键词: Counterproductive behavior; Competitive pricing; MARKETS; auctions; EFFICIENCY; INEQUALITY

摘要

Counterproductive reactions to unfavorable trading prices can cause inefficiencies in economic exchange. This paper studies whether the use of a competitive pricing mechanism reduces such wasteful activities. We report data from a laboratory experiment where a powerful buyer can trade with one of two sellers an environment that can lead to very low prices for the sellers. We find that low procurement prices trigger significantly less punishment by sellers if the buyer uses a competitive auction rather than his price-setting power to dictate the same terms of trade directly. Our data suggest that the use of competitive pricing mechanisms can mitigate inefficient reactions to unequal distributions of trade surplus. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.