Knowledge, power, and self-interest

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kittel, Bernhard; Kanitsar, Georg; Traub, Stefan
• 署名单位: University of Vienna; University of Vienna; Helmut Schmidt University; Helmut Schmidt University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.04.004
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 39-52
• 关键词: Redistribution; POWER; self-interest; INEQUALITY; network; experiment

摘要

The paper reports the results of a laboratory experiment assessing the impact of social position (endowment) and power (structurally advantaged or disadvantaged network positions) on redistributive decisions, which involve a classical efficiency-equality trade-off. The experiment involves three decision conditions: veil of ignorance, informed dictator, and majority vote. We use a three-person social-preference model in order to derive hypotheses on the effect of knowledge and power on tax choices. Our results confirm that disclosing the social position raises the measured self-interest (Knowledge Effect) and that mandating a majority vote results in concessions, the size of which depends on the player's structural position in the network (Power Effect). (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.